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NOTES & COMMENTS
LOTUS DEVELOPMENT CORP. v. PAPERBACK
SOFTWARE INT'L: COPYRIGHTABILITY FOR THE
USER INTERFACE OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE IN
THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL
REALM
Lionel M. Lavenue*
If I have seen further
it is by standing on ye shoulders of Giants.'
INTRODUCTION
Just as computers 2 have become an integral element of the legal
* J.D. Candidate, 1992, Washington College of Law, The American University.
This Note was submitted to the American Intellectual Property Law Association
(AIPLA) for the 1992 Robert C. Watson Award and to the American Society of Com-
posers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP) for the 54th Annual (1992) Nathan Burhan
Memorial Competition.
1. Sir Isaac Newton, Letter to Robert Hooke (February 5, 1675/1676), reprinted
in R. MERTON, ON THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTs: A SHANDEAN PosTscRIPT 31 (1965)
[hereinafter Newton].
2. See Stern Elecs. Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 853-56 (2d Cir. 1981) (defining
the term "computer" and explaining how the device works); Williams Elecs., Inc. v.
Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 871-74 (3d Cir. 1982) (establishing the definition of an
electronic computer).
The electronic computer ("computer") performs mathematical and logical functions
electronically. A computer consists of hardware and software. Hardware refers to the
physically embodied parts of the computer, including the metal box, the circuits (e.g.,
the central processing unit (CPU)), the input devices (e.g., the keyboard and mouse),
the output devices (e.g., the CRT or display screen and the printer or plotter), and the
input/output devices (e.g., the internal memory, including random access memory
(RAM) and read-only memory (ROM), and the external memory, including the inter-
nal or external hard disk drive and 3 and or 5 and ,4 inch disk drives). Williams
Elecs., Inc., 685 F.2d at 872. Software, on the other hand, refers to the written instruc-
tions, prepared by a human operator, which operates the computer, also called the
computer program. Id.
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profession, 3 so has the computer become an essential tool of modern
life.' Accordingly, the men and women who make these electronic mar-
vels run, these computer programmers, 5 increasingly seek greater pro-
tection for the fruits of their labor. 6 Among the sources of intellectual
3. See generally Harrington, Use of LEXIS and WESTLAW Too Is Vital To Any
Law Practice, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 12, 1987 at 18 (stating that "lawyers who do not know
what LEXIS and WESTLAW offer are practicing law with blinders. They will suffer
what they deserve.").
4. See Year of the Computer, TIME, Jan. 1, 1983, at 13 (deeming the computer
"'Man' of the Year" and describing the increasing role of computers in modern life).
5. Computer programmers produce two types of computer software: operating sys-
tem programs and application programs. Operating system programs-like DOS and
OS/2-control the hardware and actually make the machine run. Application pro-
grams instruct the computer to perform specific functions-such as word processing,
data base management, spreadsheet calculations, or games. Programmers create com-
puter programs through the use of a computer language. A machine language program,
the lowest-level computer language or a language which the computer's CPU can un-
derstand without translation, represents an object program or object code. An assembly
language program represents the intermediate-level computer language. Typically,
however, most programmers utilize a higher-level computer language which must be
translated by a compiler into information that the computer's CPU can understand. A
source program or source code, such as FORTRAN, COBOL, PASCAL, BASIC or C,
affords the programmer easier access to the control of computer operations. See D.
CURTIN & L. PORTER, MICROCOMPUTERS - SOFTWARE AND APPLICATIONS 36-78
(1986) (presenting the structure and mechanisms of the electronic computer); id. at
81-108 (explaining the types of computer software and how a computer program exe-
cutes functions and operations on the electronic computer).
6. See Note, The Expansion of the Berne Convention and the Universal Copyright
Convention to Protect Computer Software and Future Intellectual Property, 11
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 283, 285 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Future Intellectual Prop-
erty] (describing the three means by which a programmer may seek protection of a
computer program under the auspices of intellectual property: (1) patent law, (2) copy-
right law, and (3) trade secret law); see also Schachter, Intellectual Property Takes
Center Stage, ELECS., Aug. 1990, at 108 (addressing the development of patent and
copyright protection issues for computer software).
A patent generally extends a monopoly of limited duration to the inventor of the
unique idea, process, or design. J. BAXTER, WORLD PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 1
(1973). Although each nation's patent laws vary, the International Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property established a system of uniform international treat-
ment (or "national treatment"). This Convention provides for reciprocal protection be-
tween all signatory countries in that one country affords the same protection to all
computer software marketed in another signatory country as that signatory grants to
its own nationals. CONVENTION OF PARIS FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROP-
ERTY, Mar. 20, 1883, revised at Lisbon, Oct. 31, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 4931,
828 U.N.T.S. 107. At present, however, only the United States recognizes the patenta-
bility of certain types of software. Note, Future Intellectual Property, supra, at 290.
See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182-84 (1981) (first establishing the patentability
of computer software for a computer program which controlled the curing of tire
rubber).
Trade secret laws usually encompass an implied contractual relationship between the
proprietor and user of an idea, process, or design. 12 BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, MIL-
GRAM ON TRADE SECRETS § 2.01 (1984). The advantage of trade secret law is theoriti-
cal uniformity, in that most nations provide some sort of trade secret protection. Note,
Future Intellectual Property, supra, at 296. For mass-marketed computer software,
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property protection, copyright law represents the primary means of se-
curing an author's rights in computer software.7 Hence, programmers
have turned to the sources of both national and international copyright
law in protecting the basic computer program (the literal manifesta-
tions of the programmer's work) as well as the programmer's unique
expressions of creativity and originality within the work (the nonliteral
manifestations of the computer program) .
Internationally, copyright law represents a complex system of inter-
related agreements through which member-nations honor the copyright
laws of other member-nations.9 Because each nation maintains different
copyright laws, however, the term "international copyright" presents a
somewhat misleading concept. 10 In resolving an international copyright
law conflict, the parties look not to some finite body of law known as
however, trade secret law fails to provide adequate legal protection, even when the
software contains a licensing agreement. Id. at 298-99 (citing M. EPsrEIN, MODERN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 217 (1984)). This failure results from the very essence of
trade secret law-the secrecy-because trade secret directly contrasts with the re-
quired public disclosure of mass-marketed software information. See M. Scorr, Co'-
PUTER LAW § 4-25 (1984) (addressing the secrecy requirement of trade secret law);
see also T. HARRIS, THE LEGAL GUIDE TO COMPUTER SOFTWARE PROTECTION: A
PRACTICAL HANDBOOK ON COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, PUBLISHING, AND TRADE
SECRETS 135 (1985) (addressing the unavailability of trade secret protection after
disclosure).
A copyright grants the exclusive rights of reproduction, distribution, adaptation, per-
formance, and display to the owner for the life of the author plus fifty years. In the
case of a corporate author, the protection exists for 75 years after the date of first
publication or 100 years after the date of creation, whichever expires first. See J. HEL-
LER & S. WIANT, COPYRIGHT HANDBOOK 7 (1984) (describing the general rights of
the copyright owner and the term of copyright protection).
7. Note, Future Intellectual Property, supra note 6, at 283.
8. The "nonliteral manifestations of a computer program" include all components
of computer software which are inherent to the application program. For a review of
the types of computer programs, see supra note 5 (describing an application program
as a series of instructions which enable the computer to perform specific tasks). The
most common nonliteral manifestation of a computer program is the "user interface,"
or the means by which the user communicates with the computer program. I. SOMMER-
VILLE, SOFTWARE ENGINEERING 23-24 (3d ed. 1989). This Note uses the term, user
interface, to refer not to the physical means by which an operator accesses the com-
puter (via a keyboard, mouse, touch-screen, or microphone), but the computer pro-
gram's method by which the user executes commands and the textual or graphic
presentations of that method. D. LONGLEY & M. SHAIN, MACMILLAN DICTIONARY OF
PERSONAL COMPUTING & COMMUNICATIONS 186-187 (1986); WEBSTER'S NEWWORLD
DICTIONARY OF COMPUTER TERMS 193 (3d ed. 1988).
9. See infra notes 21-66 and accompanying text (describing the various interna-
tional agreements, conventions, and treaties relating to copyright).
10. See Comment, Improving the International Framework for the Protection of
Computer Software, 48 U. PITTS. L. REV. 1151, 1154 (1987) [hereinafter Comment,
Improving the International Framework] (explaining the inadequacy of the interna-
tional application of national copyright laws, which results from the unclear scope of
protection to copyrightable subject matter, especially in the case of computer software).
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international copyright but, instead, consider the copyright laws of each
member-nation in relation to any underlying agreement. In determin-
ing the actual scope of copyright protection for a single computer pro-
gram (or for the program's user interface), member-nations must give
deference to the country in which the copyright exists and/or the coun-
try in which the infringement action occurs. This "national treatment"
relegates the focus of international copyright law to the country of
most copyright conflict-the United States. For the purposes of this
Note, the doctrine of national treatment highlights the essential role of
the United States in classifying the scope of international copyright for
the user interface of computer software.
The United States maintains the most comprehensive laws establish-
ing the scope of copyright protection for computer software." All fed-
11. The copyright of computer software found its birth in Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Franklin Computer, Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S.
1033 (1984). Apple Computer led to a revolution in the judicial interpretation of copy-
right law for computer software. In 1981, the APPLE II line of personal computers,
peripheral equipment, and computer programs realized annual sales of $335,000,000
for Apple Computer Incorporated (Apple). Id. at 1242. Assessing the vast market for
personal computers in the United States, Franklin Computer Corporation (Franklin)
introduced the ACE 100 personal computer. The ACE 100 promised complete compat-
ibility with the APPLE II line of computers. Id. at 1243. Subject to this claim, Apple
sued Franklin, asserting copyright infringement for fourteen operating system pro-
grams as well as patent infringement, unfair competition, and misappropriation. In de-
fense, Franklin claimed that the fourteen computer programs at issue contained no
copyrightable subject matter. Although Franklin admitted copying the computer pro-
grams, Franklin contended that Apple's operating system programs were not copyright-
able and therefore that no copyright violation occurred. Id. at 1244. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected Franklin's defense and held that a
computer program, whether object code or source code, achieves copyrightable status
as a "literary work." Id. at 1249. See also Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685
F.2d 870, 875 (3d Cir. 1982) (concluding that the 1980 amendment to the Copyright
Act clearly establishes the copyrightability of computer programs).
The Apple Computer decision firmly established the copyrightability of computer
programs and the protection for verbatim copies of the program's source or object code;
i.e. the literal manifestations of the computer program. Id. at 878. But see White-
Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 17 (1908) (finding the sheet music
produced by a pianola roll resulted in no copyright infringement because the pianola
roll was not a "copy which appeals to the eye").
Whelan Assocs. Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987), represented the next step in fixing the exact
scope of copyright protection for computer software. The Whelan decision expanded
the Apple Computer holding by guaranteeing copyright protection to the "structure,
sequence, and organization" of a computer program. Id. at 1237-38. As a result, the
Whelan court first established copyrightability for the nonliteral manifestations of a
computer program. See infra notes 102-109 and accompanying text (providing a com-
plete analysis of the Whelan decision). See also SAS Inst., Inc. v. S & H Computer
Sys., Inc., 605 F. Supp. 816, 828-31 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) (finding that the copyright of
a computer program extends beyond the literal manifestations, even to the structure
and organization of the computer program).
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eral courts in the United States have acceded that the literal manifes-
tations of an original computer program gain full copyright
protection.12 Likewise, most federal jurisdictions also extend the same
degree of protection to certain nonliteral aspects of computer pro-
grams, including the "structure, sequence, and organization" of com-
puter software.13 Examples of these nonliteral elements include main
menu displays, hierarchical screen formats, and status screen prompts.
Only recently, however, has a United States district court specifically
addressed broadening the scope of copyright law toward these nonlit-
eral elements of computer software, specifically to the user interface of
a computer program.
1 4
On June 28, 1990, in Lotus Development Corp. v. Paperback
Software Int'l, the United States Court for the District of Massachu-
setts decided the question of copyrightability for user interface.", Lotus
Development Corporation (Lotus) had developed and marketed an ex-
tremely successful electronic spreadsheet program, LOTUS 1-2-3.16
12. See, e.g., Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855 n.3 (2d Cir. 1982)
(finding the written computer program a copyrightable literary work); Williams Elecs.,
Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 876-77 (3d Cir. 1982) (establishing the
copyrightability of the object code in a computer program); Hubco Data Prods., Corp.
v. Management Assistance Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q. 450, 454 (D. Id. 1983) (establishing the
copyrightability of the computer program's object code); GCA Corp. v. Chance, 217
U.S.P.Q. 718, 720 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (affirming the copyrightability both of the source
and object code of a computer program); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp.
741, 750 (N.D. I11. 1983) (establishing the copyrightablilty of a computer program's
source and object code).
13. See Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1222 (concluding that copyright protection for a com-
puter program extends beyond the program's literal source and object codes to the
"structure, sequence, and organization" of the program); see also Sid & Marty Krofft
Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1165-69 (9th Cir. 1977)
(establishing the same contention regarding the copyrightablilty of television commer-
cials); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54-56 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936) (establishing the same contention regarding the copyright-
ability of motion pictures); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121-23
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (193 1)(establishing the same contention regarding
the copyrightability of motion pictures).
14. See Raysman, "Lotus" Decision.: Greater Protection for Computer Programs,
N.Y.L.J., Aug. 14, 1990, at 3 (recognizing the "landmark" Lotus decision as providing
protection to user interface of computer software under the "idea/expression" theory as
opposed to the "look and feel" doctrine).
15. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass.
1990).
16. Id. at 66. The LOTUS 1-2-3 program is an electronic spreadsheet program that
enables a computer to present a blank form on the computer screen on which numeri-
cal, statistical, and other data may be assimilated, organized, manipulated, or calcu-
lated. Although known as a spreadsheet program, LOTUS 1-2-3 also represents an
integrated application program, because it performs a number of tasks, including lim-
ited word processing and data base management capabilities in addition to extensive
graphic functions. Id.
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Subject to the program's success, Paperback Software International
(Paperback) and Mosaic Software (Mosaic) soon developed "clones"'
17
of the 1-2-3 program and marketed the products under the name VP-
PLANNER and THE TWIN, respectively.' 8 Lotus sued both Paper-
back and Mosaic, claiming that VP-PLANNER and THE TWIN imi-
tated not only the structure, sequence, and organization of the LOTUS
1-2-3 program but also infringed upon the program's user interface
copyright.'" The Lotus ruling turned on whether United States copy-
right law protects the nonliteral user interface of computer software.2 0
This Note considers the copyrightability of computer software user
interface under international law as well as under the copyright laws of
the United States. Part One addresses international copyright in gen-
eral and sets forth the various organizations and agreements which
comprise the international framework for computer software copyright.
Part Two focuses on the United States, describing the history and de-
velopment of United States copyright law for computer software and
the scope of such copyright protection for computer programs. Part
Three analyzes the Lotus decision, clariflying the issues of the case, the
findings of the court, and the applicable tests of copyrightability for
computer software user interface. Finally, Part Four considers the ef-
fect of the Lotus decision on the international sources of copyright law
as well as on copyright law of the United States. Additionally, Part
Four describes upcoming decisions regarding the copyrightability of
computer software user interface in the United States and the effect of
the Lotus precedent on copyright law in general.
I. INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND
THE COPYRIGHTABILITY OF USER INTERFACE
IN COMPUTER SOFTWARE
The international copyright of computer software depends upon a re-
ciprocal relationship between the country of copyright registration and
the country in which a copyright claim originates or an infringement
17. See Pearson, The Last Days of the Clone?- Protecting the 'Look and Feel' of
Software, 3 COMPUTER L. AND PRAC. 103, 103 (1987) (defining and applying the word
"clone" as a copy of another software product).
18. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 68-70.
19. Id. at 63.
20. See generally Walter, Defining the Scope of Software Copyright Protection for
Maximum Public Benefit, 14 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1 (1988) (providing a
general discussion of the scope of computer software and describing the development of
case law regarding the copyrightability of computer software in the United States).
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action occurs.21 This distinctive relationship, or "national treatment," 22
considerably restricts the scope of copyright protection in the interna-
tional realm. 23 Under the national treatment doctrine, although a copy-
right may exist on a certain computer program in one country, the
same copyright does not necessarily apply to the program in another
international jurisdiction.24 Consequently, no uniform or standard
mechanism exists under international law by which an individual or
company may determine the true scope of copyright protection for an
original work.25 Instead, the scope of international copyright protection
depends upon a limited number of international agreements and
organizations.26
A. MEANS OF INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
FOR COMPUTER SOFTWARE
Most nations have formed one or more international agreements or
"conventions" to regulate the often conflicting national and interna-
tional copyright systems." These conventions 28 aim to broaden the doc-
21. M. FLINT, A USER'S GUIDE TO COPYRIGHT 65 (2d ed. 1985) [hereinafter
FLINT].
22. See id. at 65-66 (providing an analytical foundation to the concept or doctrine
of "national treatment"). National treatment means that the applicable law is found in
the country in which the copyright disputes take place. Id.; see B. BOORSTYN, COPY-
RIGHT LAW § 12:1-6 (1983) [hereinafter BOORSTYN] (providing an overview of the
effect of national treatment on United States law). Under the International Copyright
Act of 1891, the United States accepted "national treatment" and granted United
States copyright protection to the authors of foreign countries which afford United
States authors reciprocal protection. Id. at § 12:1.
23. See Comment, Improving the International Framework, supra note 10, at 1151
(illustrating the major drawbacks of the "national treatment" system of international
copyright protection). The national treatment of copyright in international law provides
two limitations on copyright holders: (1) an action for infringement depends on the
situs of the action and of the original copyright; and (2) international copyright law
provides for the uncertain "moral right." Id.
24. See BOORSTYN, supra note 22, at § 12:1-6 (setting out the scope of the doctrine
of national treatment).
25. Id.; see also Comment, Improving the International Framework, supra note
10, at 1151-52 (explaining how the Berne Convention and the Universal Copyright
Convention represent the two primary methods of safeguarding copyright in the inter-
national marketplace).
26. See infra notes 21-66 and accompanying text (describing the various interna-
tional agreements and organizations which seek to provide a uniform source of interna-
tional copyright protection).
27. D. JOHNSTON, COPYRIGHT HANDBOOK 116 (2d ed. 1982).
28. See W. STRONG, THE COPYRIGHT BOOK: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 173 (2d ed.
1984) [hereinafter STRONG] (noting that the international copyright conventions dis-
cuss all forms of copyright except for sound recordings, which fall under the Conven-
tion for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication
of Their Phonograms).
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trine of national treatment so that a reciprocal degree of copyright pro-
tection extends to all member-nations under the terms of any particular
convention."' In addition, nations may also subscribe to one or more
international organizations which seek to ensure a uniform standard of
international copyright.30
1. The Berne Convention
The Berne Convention,31 as the first international agreement to regu-
late intellectual property, 32 represents the most recognized source of in-
ternational copyright law. Computer software appears to fall within the
scope of article 2 of the Convention.3 3 Although the United States only
elected to join the Berne Convention in October of 1988,34 authors in
29. FLINT, supra note 21, at 65-66.
30. See infra note 74 (describing the efforts of the European Community and of
the member-nations of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade to promulgate an
international standard of computer software copyright).
31. See UNESCO, COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD Vol. 111, item
H-i, at 1-22 (Supp. 1972) [hereinafter Berne Convention] (providing a text of the
Paris version (1971) of the Berne Convention).
Since the inception of the Berne Convention in 1886, the agreement has undergone
several revisions, including the latest in 1971 in Paris. See Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. States Party on January 1. 1986, 22 Copy-
RIGHT 6 (1986) (listing dates of revisions and dates on which states have become a
member to the Berne Convention). The Berne Convention was created in 1886 in Paris
and revised in 1908 in Berlin, in 1914 in Berne, in 1928 in Rome, in 1948 in Brussels,
in 1968 in Stockholm, and in 1971 in Paris. Id. As of May 10, 1989, the following
states had ratified or acceded to the Paris version of the Berne Convention:
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Benin, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Congo,
Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland,
France, Gabon, Germany, Greece, Guinea, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, India,
Italy, Japan, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius,
Mexico, Monaco, Morocco, Netherlands, Niger, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Por-
tugal, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Surinam, Sweden,
Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States
of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, and Zimbabwe.
UNESCO, COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD Vol. III, item H-2, at 1-2
(Supp. 1987-88).
32. See R. WHALE, WHALE ON COPYRIGHT 185 (3d ed. 1983) [hereinafter
WHALE] (discussing the role of international copyright, international law, and the
Berne Convention in the international intellectual property system).
33. See Kinderman, Computer Software and Copyright Conventions, 3 EUR. IN-
TELL. PROP. REV. 6, 8 (1981) (concluding that the "absence of limits [in Article 2] on
expression may be taken as an explicit confirmation of the fact that the machine-reada-
ble computer program is a work protected under the Convention").
34. See Senate Approves Berne Convention Treaty, Yeutter Hails Effect on U.S.
Trade Balance, INT'L TRADE REP., Oct. 26, 1988, at 1430 (discussing the Berne Con-
vention's effect on the United States trade balance); see also Comment, Software
Piracy: The United States Needs to Utilize the Protection Provided by the Berne Con-
vention in the Pacific Rim, 3 EMORY J. INT'L DIS. RES. 135 (1988) (describing the
296 [VOL. 7:289
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the United States have nevertheless long enjoyed protection under the
Berne Convention via a "back door." 35 The Berne Convention, how-
ever, neither specifically mentions computer software nor addresses the
scope of copyright protection for computer programs.
2. The Universal Copyright Convention
The Universal Copyright Convention3" (UCC) was initiated by the
United States and now represents the second most recognized source of
international copyright protection."' Adopted in 1952, the UCC origi-
nally required only "adequate and effective protection" for works under
international copyright. 38 Under the Paris revision of 1971, however,
the UCC was expanded to protect the economic interests of "authors
and other copyright proprietors in literary, scientific and artistic works,
including writings, musical, dramatic and cinematographic works, and
paintings, engravings and sculpture."39 Computer software most likely
effect of the Berne Convention and other treaties on international computer software
protection).
35. BOORSTYN, supra note 22, at §12:3. Although the United States only recently
joined the Berne Convention, American individuals and businesses alike have long uti-
lized a "back door" approach to the convention. Id. By publishing works simultane-
ously in the United States and in a Berne country, the "back door" approach effec-
tively gave United States nationals ample protection prior to the United States Senate's
ratification of the Berne Convention in 1988. Id.
36. See UNESCO, COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD vol. III, item
B-I, at 1-14 (Supp. 1972) [hereinafter UCC] (providing a text of the Universal Copy-
right Convention). The UCC was revised in Paris in 1971. Id. As of May 15, 1989, the
following states had ratified or acceded to the UCC:
Algeria, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Cameroon, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Repub-
lic, El Salvador, Finland, France, Germany, Guinea, Holy See, Hungary, India,
Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Monaco, Morocco, Netherlands, Niger, Norway,
Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines, Senegal, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia,
United Kingdom, United States of America, and Yugoslavia.
Id. item B-2, at 1-5 (Supp. 1987-88).
37. See STRONG, supra note 28, at 174 (explaining that the UCC was enacted by
the United States in the hope that it would qualify the United States for membership
in the Berne Convention). Theoretically, "the UCC provides that every member nation
will give to a work first published in another member nation, or created by a citizen of
another member nation, the same protection that it gives works of its own citizens that
are first published within its own borders." Id. Practically, however, "[i]f you are a
U.S. citizen or a citizen of another UCC country, protection is automatic. Once you
publish, assuming you publish first in the United States, you must follow the US.
rules; no country has stricter formalities than the United States, and U.S. notice will
protect your rights everywhere." Id. at 176.
38. WHALE, supra note 32, at 191.
39. UCC, supra note 36, at art. I.
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falls under the "scientific writings" category." Similar to the Berne
Convention, however, the UCC does not provide explicit protection for
computer software or the user interface of computer programs. 1
3. The World Intellectual Property Organization
The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), 2 by request
of the United Nations, formulated a series of proposals which represent
the third most recognized source of international copyright protection.
48
In light of problems surrounding the Berne Convention and the UCC,
4 4
WIPO created a new international copyright treaty proposal designed
specifically to protect computer software.45 Most nations, however, have
rejected the attempts by WIPO to formulate a standard for interna-
tional computer software protection.46 Therefore, although the pro-
posed WIPO Treaty probably affords protection even for the user inter-
40. Comment, International Copyright Law Applied to Computer Programs in the
United States and France, 14 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 105, 110 (1982).
41. The United States has been a member of the UCC since its inception; however,
recent admission into the Berne Convention will not implicate any protections under
the UCC. WHALE, supra note 32, at 193.
42. As of 1984, the following states were members of the WIPO:
Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Benin,
Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Cameroon, Canada, Central Afri-
can Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire,
Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Egypt,
El Salvador, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece,
Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia,
Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Libya, Liechtenstein,
Luxembourg, Malawi, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco,
Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Pakistan, Pan-
ama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania,
Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, South Africa, Soviet Union, Spain,
Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia,
Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom,
United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vietnam, Yemen, Yugoslavia,
Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
WIPO, GENERAL INFORMATION 73, Doc. 400(E) (Geneva 1984). See also Note, Fu-
ture Intellectual Property, supra note 6, at 309-313 (discussing generally the means to
granting greater international copyright protection and proposed means in achieving
this goal).
43. See Note, World-Wide Protection of Computer Software: An Analysis of the
WIPO Draft Proposal, 2 N.Y.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 278, 294-312 (1981) (analyzing
WIPO's draft proposals for creating a new system to protect computer software).
44. See Comment, Improving the International Framework, supra note 10, at
1151-52 (stating that the three major problems of national treatment of copyright pro-
tection include the uncertainty of the scope of international law, moral rights, and the
length of minimum periods of protection).
45. WIPO INTERNATIONAL UNION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROP-
ERTY (PARIS UNION), REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON THE LEGAL PRO-
TECTION OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE, Doc. L.P.C.S./II/6 (1983).
46. Note, Future Intellectual Property, supra note 6, at 310.
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face of computer programs,'47 its world-wide rejection inhibits any
realistic application to international copyright law.'8
4. Bilateral and Multilateral Agreements
In addition to international copyright conventions and the proposed
WIPO Treaty, bilateral and multilateral treaties provide another
means of international copyright protection .' Examples of these bilat-
eral, multilateral, and regional agreements include the Buenos Aires
Convention,5" the Caracas Copyright Agreement, 1 the Havana Copy-
right Convention, 52 the Mexico City Copyright Convention,53 the Rio
47. See WIPO INTERNATIONAL UNION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL
PROPERTY (PARIS UNION), DRAFT TREATY FOR THE PROTECTION OF COMPUTER
SOFTWARE 3-15, Doc. L.P.C.S./II/3 § l(i) (1983) [hereinafter WIPO Treaty] (stating
that the proprietor, or copyright owner, "shall have the right to prevent any person
from ... using the computer program to produce the same or a substantially similar
computer program or a program description of the computer program or of a substan-
tially similar computer program.") (Emphasis added.)
48. See Kolle, Computer Software Protection-Present Situation and Future Pros-
pects, 13 COPYRIGHT 70 (1977) (addressing the result of WIPO's drafts for special
legislation, such as the proposed WIPO treaty, on the protection of software both at the
national and the international levels).
49. BOORSTYN, supra note 22, at § 12:6. "The significance of this basis [of interna-
tional copyright protection] is twofold: bilateral [multilateral, and regional] arrange-
ments are applicable even in the absence of a formal treaty or of membership in one of
the international conventions, and such arrangements will govern activities that predate
the effective date of membership in an international treaty." Id.
50. See UNESCO, COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD Vol. 111, item
1, at 1-2 (Supp. 1972) (providing a text of the Buenos Aires Convention (BAC)). As of
1976, the following states had ratified the BAC:
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay,
Peru, United States of America, and Uruguay.
Id. item 2, at I (Supp. 1975-76). The BAC comprises a Latin- and inter-American
copyright agreement. BOORSTYN, supra note 22, at §12:4. The United States ratified
the BAC on May 1, 1911. Id. The BAC provides copyright protection to the original
works of member-nations, except phonograph records, so long as copies of the work
bear a statement indicating the reservation of the property. Id. The BAC, like most
regional agreements, does not provide protection for computer software.
51. See UNESCO, COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD vol. II1, item
1, at I (Supp. 1972) (providing a text of the Caracas Copyright Agreement). As of
1972, only Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela had ratified the agreement. Id. item
2, at 1.
52. See UNESCO, COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD vol. 111, item
1, at 1-2 (Supp. 1972) (providing a text of the Havana Copyright Convention). As of
1972, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Panama had ratified the con-
vention. Id. item 2, at 1.
53. See UNESCO, COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD vol. III, item
1, at 1-2 (Supp. 1972) (providing a text of the Mexico City Copyright Convention). As
of 1972, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicara-
gua, and the United States of America had ratified the convention. Id. item 2, at I.
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de Janeiro Copyright Convention," and the Washington Copyright
Convention. 5 When enforcing a copyright under a bilateral or multi-
lateral treaty, the domestic copyright laws of the member-nations be-
come equally compelling as under under one of the international con-
ventions .5  Therefore, because the bilateral and multilateral copyright
treaties depend almost entirely upon the doctrine of national treatment,
the treaties provide only limited advantage over the common protec-
tions afforded under the broader international copyright agreements
and conventions.5 None of these bilateral, multilateral, or regional
copyright agreements, moreover, specifically addresses the copyright of
computer software.58
5. Other Forms of International Copyright Protection
In addition to the more common means of international copyright
protection outlined above, certain regional and work-specific agree-
ments provide independent or increased protection for the copyright
owner under the international copyright system.5 9 Examples of such
protection include the European Agreement on the Protection of Tele-
vision Broadcasts,60 the European Agreement for the Prevention of
Broadcasts Transmitted from Stations Outside National Territories, 1
54. See UNESCO, COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD Vol. I1, item
1, at 1-3 (Supp. 1972) (providing a text of the Rio de Janeiro Copyright Convention).
As of 1972, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador Guatemala, Honduras,
Nicaragua, and Panama had ratified the convention. Id. item 2, at 1.
55. See UNESCO, COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD Vol. III, item
1, at 1-4 (Supp. 1972) (providing a text of the Washington Copyright Convention). As
of 1973, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Paraguay
had ratified the convention. Id. item 2, at 1 (Supp. 1973).
56. See generally supra notes 49-58 (citing examples of bilateral, multilateral, and
regional treaties under which the doctrine of national treatment applies).
57. See supra notes 31-48 and accompanying text (setting forth the most common
sources of international copyright).
58. See supra notes 50-55 (referring to texts of bilateral, multilateral and regional
treaties to demonstrate that none offer specific protection for computer software).
59. WHALE, supra note 32, at 198-211.
60. See UNESCO, COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD vol. III, item
C-I, at 1-4 (Supp. 1970) (providing a text of the European Agreement on the Protec-
tion of Television Broadcasts). As of 1983, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Ger-
many, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and the United Kingdom had ratified or ac-
ceded to the agreement. Id. item C-6, at I (Supp. 1981-83).
61. See UNESCO, COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD Vol. III, item
F-I, at 1 (Supp. 1972) (providing a text of the European Agreement for the Prevention
of Broadcasts Transmitted from Stations Outside National Territories). As of 1988,
Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein,
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United
Kingdom had ratified or acceded to the agreement. Id. item F-2, at I (Supp. 1987-88).
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the International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Produc-
ers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations,02 the Convention
for Avoidance of Double Taxation on Copyright Royalties, 3 the Con-
vention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unau-
thorized Duplication of Their Phonograms,64 and the Convention Re-
lating to the Distribution of Programme-Carrying Signals Transmitted
by Satellite.65 With the exception of the WIPO Treaty,60 however, no
current or proposed work-specific international agreement, treaty, or
convention affords special protection to computer software.
62. See UNESCO, COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD Vol. III, item
B-1, at 1 (Supp. 1962) (providing a text of the International Convention for the Protec-
tion of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations). As of
1988, the following countries had either ratified or acceded to the convention:
Austria, Barbados, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica,
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Guatemala, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Mexico, Mon-
aco, Niger, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sweden, United
Kingdom, and Uruguay.
Id. item B-2, at 1 (Supp. 1987-88).
63. See UNESCO, COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD vol. III, item
1, at I (Supp. 1972) (providing a text of the Convention for Avoidance of Double
Taxation on Copyright Royalties). As of 1988, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, India, Iraq, and
Peru had ratified or acceded to the agreement and protocol. Id. item 2, at I (Supp.
1987-88).
64. See UNESCO, COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD vol. III, item
D-1, at I (Supp. 1972) (providing a text of the Convention for the Protection of Pro-
ducers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phonograms). As of
January 30, 1988, the following countries had either ratified or acceded to the
convention:
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Chile, Costa
Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Finland,
France, Germany, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Kenya, Luxembourg, Mexico, Monaco, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Para-
guay, Peru, Republic of Korea, Spain, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, United
Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Zaire.
Id. item D-2, at 1 (Supp. 1987-88).
65. See UNESCO, COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD VOI. III, item
E-1, at 1-3 (Supp. 1974) (providing a text of the Convention Relating to the Distribu-
tion of Programme-Carrying Signals Transmitted by Satellite, or the Brussels Conven-
tion on the Protection of Satellite Transmissions). As of 1988, Austria, Germany, Italy,
Kenya, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Soviet Union, United States of
America, and Yugoslavia had either ratified or acceded to the convention. Id. item E-2,
at I (Supp. 1987-88).
66. See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text (describing the one specific
source of international copyright protection for computer software).
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B. THE CURRENT AND FUTURE STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL
COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR COMPUTER SOFTWARE
Internationally, the extension of copyright protection to computer
software remains a very recent phenomenon.17 The level of economic
sophistication serves as a prohibitive factor in the development of com-
puter software opportunities in many countries, because a country's
technological know-how constitutes a condition precedent to the devel-
opment of a competent computer industry. Not surprisingly, the na-
tions with the largest computer software industries possess the most
developed copyright systems for the protection of the computer
program, specifically Japan,68  Germany, 9  France,0  Cana-
67. See Staines, The European Commission's Proposal for a Council Directive on
the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 6 EUR. INTELL. PROP. J. 183, 184 (1989)
[hereinafter Staines] (arguing that "copyright has kept computer software in the legal
equivalent of a technology trap").
68. Japanese law explicitly includes software as a copyrightable work. Hoffman,
Protection for Computer Software: An International Overview: Part 1, 11 EUR. IN-
TELL. PROP. REV. 337, 341 (1988) [hereinafter An International Overview]. Moveover,
because of the language used in the legislation, even the nonliteral aspects of a com-
puter program (like the user interface) gain copyrightable status under Japanese law.
Id.
69. In 1981, a German district court ruled that "no intellectual aesthetic content is
ordinarily found in computer programs which could enable them to be included in the
category of creative works" for copyrightable status. An International Overview, supra
note 68, at 339. When the decision was overruled by a higher court, however, no clear
standard for the scope of German copyright remained. Finally, in 1985, the German
Supreme Court adopted a two-part test: (1) the originality requirement, or the "test of
personal intellectual creation;" and (2) a comparison test. The comparison test consid-
ered whether "the tested work reveals creative originality of such a degree as compared
with the results of an average programmer, [and if so,] then the program is an intellec-
tual creation." Id. Apparently, for the purposes of computer software copyright, the net
effect of the German Supreme Court's test could represent a more expansive applica-
tion of German copyright law than the copyright law of the United States. See id.
(noting that "the relatively restrictive copyright standard may provide problems for
foreign software vendors").
70. Similar to Germany, until 1985 French federal courts initially rejected copy-
right for computer programs, citing the "absence of aesthetic character, banality and
technological rather than artistic character." An International Overview, supra note
68, at 340. On March 7, 1986, however, the French Supreme Court ruled that copy-
right protection for computer software, again like Germany, depended on the original-
ity requirement. Unlike Germany, however, the French Supreme Court did not insti-
tute a second "comparison test." See supra note 69 (describing the German
comparison test). In addition, following the legal or judicial dispute over the copyright-
ability of computer software in France, the French Senate passed sixty-six new Arti-
cles, thereby amending the 1957 Copyright Law, which explicitly provided for the
copyrightability of computer software. Not surprisingly, the current French copyright
system provides explicit protection for the user interface of a computer program. Id. at
341. Under precedent case law in France, moreover, "'a program could be considered
a copy of another program if its structure with its most characteristic elements is dupli-
cated, even if this copy is written in another programming language.'" Id. (quoting
Bertrand, French Supreme Court Declares Software and Video Games 'Original
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da,71 and the United States.7 2
The exact scope of international copyright protection for computer
software remains uncertain, especially with regard to the nonliteral
manifestations of a computer program. While international copyright
conventions implicitly, and the proposed WIPO treaty explicitly, grant
copyright protection to computer software, the standard approach to
the international copyrightability of computer software is anything but
uniform. Presently, the scope of international copyright protection for
computer software spans the spectrum, from a complete absence of
copyright protection in the Middle East, to expansive protection in the
most industrialized nations.7
Recent attempts to improve or advance international copyright have
also included efforts to expand protection to computer software, includ-
ing several recent endeavors by the European Community" and a more
comprehensive standard under a proposed amendment to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 5 Only in the United States,
however, have federal courts begun to expand the scope of copyright
protection not only to computer software but also to the nonliteral ele-
ments of the computer program. As a result of the uncertainty of inter-
Works of Authorship' Under the 1957 Copyright Act, SOFVARE PROTECtION, Feb.
1986, at 14).
71. In contrast to Japan, Germany, and France, Canada demonstrates the most
restrictive application of copyright to computer software among the developmental
countries for computer programs, extending protection solely to the source and object
code of a computer program. An International Overview, supra note 68, at 343. Both in
International Bus. Mach. Corp. v. Ordinateurs Spirales, Inc., I F.C. 190 (1985). 80
C.P.R.2d 187 (T.D. 1984), and Apple Computer, Inc. v. Macintosh, I F.C. 173 (1987),
10 C.P.R.3d 1 (T.D. 1986), federal Canadian courts affirmed copyright for computer
programs under the Canadian Copyright Act of 1921. See also Apple Computer Inc. v.
Minitronics of Canada Ltd. and Others, 2 F.C. 265 (1988). 7 C.P.R.3d 104 (Fed. Ct.
1985) (verifying that computer programs both in source and object code fall under the
protection of the Canadian Copyright Act of 1921). Legislation regarding broader pro-
tections of computer software, however, has faced substantial opposition in Canada. An
International Overview, supra note 68, at 342-43. As a result, neither Canadian courts
nor law-makers have demonstrated any desire to expand the scope of copyright protec-
tion past the literal manifestations of the computer program. Id. at 344.
72. See infra notes 76-142 and accompanying text (describing the copyright system
of the United States and the scope of protection under that system).
73. Efforts to Negotiate Bilateral Agreements to Curb Piracy Continuing, INT'L
TRADE REP. (BNA), at 1433 (Oct. 26, 1988).
74. See Staines, supra note 67, at 183-84. For a detailed analysis of computer
software copyright protection in the European Community, see Platton, The Council on
the Legal Protection of Computer Programs: An Unsatisfactory Balance of Competing
Interests, 7 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'y 235 (1992).
75. Administration Efforts to Improve Foreign Protection of US. Rights Review
by Panel, INr'L TRADE REP. (BNA), at 1044 (Aug. 13, 1986); Ways to Improve For-
eign Protection Examined by Meeting on GATT, INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA), at 522
(April 16, 1986).
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national copyright law under the national treatment doctrine, the
United States also maintains an important position as the locus of
many major computer industry copyrights. The development and the
current status of United States copyright law, therefore, serve an essen-
tial role in defining the scope of copyright protection for computer
software and the user interface thereof under international law. Thus,
as emphasized by the doctrine of national treatment, the scope of pro-
tection for an international copyright may depend entirely upon the
copyright law of the United States.
II. THE COPYRIGHTABILITY OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE
IN THE UNITED STATES
Article I of the United States Constitution specifically guarantees an
exclusive right of copyright to an author's original work.7 6 Yet, similar
to other developed countries," no common law procedure exists for ac-
quiring a copyright in the United States.7 8 Instead, the copyrightability
of any particular "original work of authorship" depends entirely upon
the will of Congress to pass laws providing copyright protection and
delineating the scope of that protection for an original work.79 Conse-
quently, the copyrightability of computer software and of user interface
hinges upon the federal copyright statutes and their interpretations as
annunciated in precedent federal case law.
A. SCOPE OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE COPYRIGHT
UNDER FEDERAL STATUTE
Throughout the two-hundred year evolution of copyright law in the
United States, Congress has expanded and narrowed the scope of fed-
eral copyright protection. 0 Since the Copyright Act of 1909 (the 1909
76. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see id. (referencing the power of Congress "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries").
77. See An International Overview, supra note 68, at 338-42 (explaining how Ger-
many, France, Japan, and Canada extend copyright protection through legislative
means); but see Davidson, Common Law, Uncommon Software, 47 U. Prr. L. REV.
1037, 1067-70 (1986) (arguing that "the common law process is superior to legislative
fiat in solving complex [copyright] problems ... [like] the complexity of [integrating] a
new technology like software into our economy").
78. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
79. See Banks v. Manchester, Ohio, 128 U.S. 244, 252 (1888) (stating that the
authority for and extent of a copyright depends entirely upon the legislation of
Congress).
80. The First Congress originally sought to construe an all-inclusive listing of copy-
rightable works. See A. LATMAN, COPYRIGHT FOR THE EIGHTIES 4-6 (2d ed. 1985)
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Act), however, Congress has merely defined a non-exclusive list of cer-
tain "categories" of copyrightable works and has left interpretation of
the statute to the courts.81 The most recent version of the copyright
law, the Copyright Act of 1976 (the 1976 Act), likewise extends the
same form of generalized copyright protection to copyrightable "cate-
gories" of work,82 defining a copyrightable work as "original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression. "83
(reciting congressional adoption of the old Statute of Anne and the courts' strict con-
struction of the Statute in the Act). As the list grew and the sources of copyrightable
works expanded, however, a single listing became impracticable. See also Baumgarten,
Copyright in High Technology Products and Sensitive Business Information 1-4 (Sept.
1982), reprinted in GILBURNE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN HIGH TECHNOL-
OGY PRODUCTS AND IN SENSITIvE BUSINESS INFORMATION 63 (1982) (addressing the
development of United States copyright law).
81. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 4, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076 (previously codified at
17 U.S.C. § 4, (reprinted in 17 U.S.C.A. App. § 4 (West Supp. 1991)); recodified
1947; repealed 1976).
82. Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§
101-118).
83. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988) (delineating the scope of copyright protection
under United States copyright law). The Act stipulates:
Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later de-
veloped, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communi-
cated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.
Id. (Emphasis added.)
To clarify the meaning and scope of "works of authorship," the Act includes a list of
seven exemplary categories which satisfy the statutory requirements for a copyrightable
work under each category. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988) (setting forth the seven
categories of copyrightable works). The Act provides:
Works of authorship include the following categories: (1) literary works; (2) mu-
sical works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including
any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) picto-
rial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual
works; and (7) sound recordings.
Id.
As illustrated by the legislative history, Congress intended the seven categories as
"illustrative and not limitative" and "not necessarily exhaust[ing] the scope of 'original
works of authorship' that the bill is intended to protect." H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 53, reprinted at 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs 5666, 5664.
For decisions illustrating a judicial broadening from these seven categories, see, e.g.,
National Theme Prods., Inc. v. Jerry B. Beck, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 1348, 1354 (S.D. Cal.
1988) (extending copyright protection to the artistic features of masquerade costumes);
West Pub. Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d 1219, 1223-27 (8th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1070 (1987) (extending copyright protection to the arrangement of
public-domain legal decisions in law reporters); S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Associated
Tel. Directory Pubs., 756 F.2d 801, 808-11 (11 th Cir. 1985) (extending copyright pro-
tection to telephone books); Pacific and S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1494, reh'g
denied, 749 F.2d 733 (1 1th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1004 (1985) (extending
copyright protection to televised news reports).
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Although the words "computer software" are not mentioned in the
1976 Act,84 most federal courts have determined that Congress had in-
tended to place computer software under the first category of copy-
rightable material, or in the "literary works" category. 5 Under an ex-
acting interpretation of the 1976 Act, however, the copyrightability and
scope of computer software86 remained unclear until the early 1980's.87
In 1978, the National Commission on New Technological Uses of
Copyrighted Works (CONTU) attempted to resolve the computer
software question by recommending that Congress amend the 1976 Act
to expressly include copyrightability for computer programs. 8 Two
84. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2D SESS. 53, reprinted at 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5659, 5666 (describing the meaning and scope of "work
of authorship" under the 1976 Act). The "work of authorship" distinction encompasses
two categories: first, scientific discoveries and technological developments and second,
novels or plays, photographs, sound recordings, and motion pictures. Id. at 51, re-
printed at 5664. Although not specifically mentioned in the 1976 Act, computer
software seemingly falls within the first category of copyrightable works. See J.
LAUTSCH, AMERICAN STANDARD HANDBOOK OF SOFTWARE BUSINEss LAW § 5.3
(1985) (observing that, prior to the 1976 Act, computer programs were regarded as
"books" under United States copyright law).
85. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (describing the meaning of the term "literary
work" under the 1976 Act). The 1976 Act provides:
"Literary works" are works, other than audiovisual works, expressed in words,
numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the na-
ture of the material objects such as books, periodicals, manuscripts, pho-
norecords, film, tapes, disks, or cards, in which they are embodied.
Id.
For a verbatim affirmance of the congressional intent to include computer software
within the "literary works" category, see also H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2D
SEss. 54, reprinted at 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5667 (stating
that the term "literary works" includes computer programs); id. at 51, reprinted at
5664 (establishing that computer programs had been considered copyrightable from the
inception of the computer program); id. at 116, reprinted at 5731 (concluding that the
1976 Act establishes and governs the copyrightability of computer programs).
86. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988) (providing the official statutory explanation on
the scope of copyright under the 1976 Act). Section 102(b) of the 1976 Act states:
In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to
any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated,
or embodied in such work.
Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2D SEss. 57, reprinted at 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5670 (describing how section 102(b) protects the ex-
pression of the programmer as embodied in the software product but not the actual
processes or methods implemented in order to achieve the desired result in the pro-
gram); id. at 54, reprinted at 5667 (establishing that a copyright protects the program-
mer's expression of original ideas but not the ideas alone).
87. See Raskind, The Uncertain Case for Special Legislation Protecting Computer
Software, 47 U. PITT. L. REv. 1131, 1136 n.13 (1986) [hereinafter Raskind] (citing
congressional failure or inability to resolve the treatment of computer software under
the 1976 Act).
88. Even before the completion of the 1976 Act, Congress had realized the techni-
cal problems surrounding the copyright of computer software. As a result, in order to
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years later, Congress adopted the CONTU recommendations almost
verbatim in the Computer Software Copyright Act of 1980 (the 1980
Act).89 This Act promulgated the definition of a computer program as
a "set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a
computer in order to bring a certain result."90
Since the promulgation of the 1980 Act, the post-CONTU federal
copyright statutes have not addressed the copyrightability of user inter-
face for computer software. 91 Federal case law, however, includes per-
suasive arguments both for and against the extension of federal copy-
right law to the nonliteral manifestations of computer software. 92
B. SCOPE OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE COPYRIGHT
UNDER FEDERAL CASE LAW
After Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer, Corp.13 estab-
lished copyrightability for the program code of computer programs (the
literal elements of a computer program), questions arose regarding the
copyrightability of the nonliteral aspects of computer software.0 The
first cases involved the copyrightability of a computer program's screen
more adequately address the issues regarding high technology copyright, Congress au-
thorized the President to create the National Commission on New Technological Uses
of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) in December of 1974. See Act of Dec. 31, 1974,
Pub. L. 93-573, tit. II, 88 Stat. 1873 (1974) (charging that the commission should
recommend new laws or procedures to ensure the protection of copyrighted works on
automatic systems capable of information storage, processing, transfer, and retrieval).
In July of 1978, CONTU released its report and recommendations. NATIONAL CONI-
MISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1978), reprinted in 5 COPYRIGHT, CONGRESS AND TECHNOL-
OGY: THE PUBLIC RECORD (N. Henry, ed. 1980) [hereinafter CONTU Report].
The CONTU Report concluded that the success of a competitive market in com-
puter software necessitated the availability of adequate copyright protection. See
CONTU Report, supra, at 20-21. Yet, the Commission avoided any recommendations
regarding the copyrightability of the nonliteral aspects of computer software. For an
analysis of the personal views of the CONTU commissioners regarding the copyright-
ability of nonliteral manifestations of computer software, see Note, Idea. Process, or
Protected Expression.: Determining the Scope of Copyright Protection of the Struc-
ture of Computer Programs, 88 MICH. L. REV. 866, 889-90 (1990) [hereinafter Deter-
mining the Scope of Copyright Protection] (noting that Melville Nimmer, Vice-
Chairperson of CONTU favored, and Commissioner Arthur Miller and Executive Di-
rector Arthur Levine opposed, copyrightability for the nonliteral manifestations of
computer software).
89. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
90. Id.
91. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 50 (D.
Mass. 1990).
92. Id. at 55.
93. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249-
51 (3d Cir. 1983) cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
94. See Raskind, supra note 87, at 1158-59.
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displays as "audiovisual works."' 5 These initial cases, however, failed to
address the broader issue of whether a computer program's original
copyright protection extends to all aspects of the computer program,
including the user interface, or solely to the program code. If copyright
protection in fact extends to the user interface of computer software,
the second issue would involve the scope of that protection. The follow-
ing cases outline the development of federal precedent case law regard-
ing these two issues.
1. Synercom Tech., Inc. v. University Computing Co.
In Synercom Technology Inc. v. University Computing Co.,"0 the
federal court for the northern district of Texas first addressed the issue
of copyright for the nonliteral manifestations of a computer program.
The dispute originated in 1969, when Synercom Technology, Inc.
(Synercom) developed new input formats for IBM's Framed Structure
Analysis Program (FRAM) and, after modification, produced and
copyrighted a more advanced version of the program called STRAN. 97
In 1974, Engineering Dynamics, Inc. (EDI) developed a compatible
STRAN program called SACS 11.98 University Computing Company
(University) joined EDI in 1976, after University's contract to provide
hardware to Synercom expired. Synercom subsequently filed a copy-
right infringement suit against EDI and University, claiming that the
SACS II program improperly copied STRAN's input formats and
manuals.99
The Synercom court addressed the copyright infringement claim by
considering the copyrightability of input formats under an idea/expres-
sion analysis. 100 Rejecting the mere "format" of a computer program
as the proper subject matter of copyright protection, the Synercom
95. See, e.g., Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 74 (3rd Cir.
1982); Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855 (2d Cir. 1982); Midway Mfg.
Co. v. Strohan, 564 F. Supp. 741, 746 (N.D. Il. 1983) (finding in each of these cases
that a computer program's screen display for a video game is separately copyrightable
as an audiovisual work).
96. 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Texas 1978).
97. Id. at 1005-07. Like the FRAM program, STRAN solved engineering problems
incident to structural analyses. With the new input formats, however, the new STRAN
version allowed for more user friendly access. Id. at 1006. To ensure full protection of
the STRAN program, Synercom copyrighted the new input formats as well as the
complete STRAN program. Id. at 1006-07.
98. Id. at 1008.
99. Id. at 1008-09.
100. Id. at 1011-12. For an overview and analysis of the idea/expression analysis,
see infra notes 173-80 and accompanying text (describing the Baker v. Seldan ap-
proach to copyrightability for ideas and/or expressions).
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court concluded that the "order and sequence" of a computer program
precluded copyright protection under United States law.101 Synercom
thus represented the first case to expressly reject copyright protection
of the user interface of computer software.
2. Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc.
In August of 1986, in Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab-
oratory, Inc.,102 a Pennsylvania district court considered the copyright-
ability of the nonliteral elements of a computer program. Whelan Asso-
ciates, Inc. (Whelan) owned the copyright to a dental program called
DENTALAB, designed to aid in the administration of dental prosthet-
ics laboratories. 10 Three years after the completion of DENTALAB,
written in a computer language called EDL, Rand Jaslow developed a
similar program called DENTCOM, 101 which was written in BA-
SIC.105 Whelan sued Jaslow claiming that DENTCOM had infringed
upon certain copyrightable, yet nonliteral, elements of the
DENTALAB program. 106
The Whelan court relied primarily upon the Arnstein v. Porter'07
substantial similarity test, instead of Synercom's idea/expression dis-
tinction, to distinguish the DENTALAB from the DENTCOM pro-
101. Id. at 1013-14. Judge Higgenbotham did state that copyright protection ex-
tends to "cases of literary or artistic works, and works of similar character, in which
the form, arrangement or combination of ideas represents the product of labor and
skilled effort separate and apart from that entailed in the development of the intellec-
tual conception involved." Id. at 1014 (quoting Long v. Jordan, 29 F. Supp. 287, 288
(N.D. Cal. 1939)). Finding that the execution format of a computer program seem-
ingly "merges" with the idea of the program, however, Judge Higgenbotham rejected
the copyright of a "format." Id. The court nevertheless concluded: "[ilt would follow
that only to the extent the expressions involve stylistic creativity above and beyond the
bare expression of sequence and arrangement, should they be protected." Id. (Empha-
sis in original.)
102. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d. Cir. 1986).
103. Id. at 1225-26. DENTALAB, written in a computer language known as Event
Driven Language (EDL), was compatible only with the IBM Series One computers. Id.
at 1126.
104. Id. at 1225-26. The concept of DENTALAB represented a joint venture of
two authors, including Rand Jaslow's ideas and Elaine Whelan's EDL programming
ability. Id.
105. Id. at 1226. The BASIC version was designed to work specifically with the
newer IBM PC, and was incompatible with the IBM Series One computers. Id.
106. Id. at 1227. As a BASIC program, DENTCOM contained an entirely differ-
ent source and object code than DENTALAB, which as written in EDL. Whelan sued
not for the literal copying of the program, however, but for the copying of the organiza-
tion of the DENTLAB program by the author of DENTCOM. Id.
107. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
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grams as well as to evaluate the copyright infringement claim."0 8 Al-
though Whelan recognized the use of two different computer languages
(i.e., EDL and BASIC), the court determined that the "structure, se-
quence, and organization" of the DENTALAB program represented
copyrightable expression, a copyright which DENTCOM had vio-
lated. 109 By affirming this copyright infringement action, Whelan first
established copyrightability for the nonliteral aspects of a computer
program.
3. Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc.
In October of 1986, in Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World,
Inc.,1 0 a California district court addressed the dual issues of copyright
for nonliteral manifestations in computer software as well as the
copyrightability of audiovisual displays in computer programs. In 1984,
Broderbund Software (Broderbund) began marketing THE PRINT
108. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1232-33. The Whelan court outlined the various analyses
by which substantial similarity has been adjudged. Id. Citing the most applied test
from Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946), the Whelan court fully described
the application of the two-prong Arnstein substantial similarity test. Id. The two-part
Arnstein test first applies an "extrinsic" test, determining whether a substantial simi-
larity exists between the two works in question to conclude whether the alleged in-
fringer applied a copyrighted work. Id. at 1232. Second, if the first test results in an
affirmative finding, the Arnstein test applies an "intrinsic" test which considers, based
on an ordinary or lay observer's perspective, whether the alleged infringer made an
unlawful copy of the copyrighted work. Id. The court recognized, however, that some
substantial similarity analyses involve solely the first part of the Arnstein test, because
the complex nature of computer programs call for experts in the judicial decision-mak-
ing process. Id. at 1232-33. As a result, the Whelan court adopted a single substantial
similarity inquiry, thus allowing both lay and expert testimony for judicial considera-
tion. Id. at 1233. For earlier applications of the modified Arnstein tests of substantial
similarity as used by the Whelan court, see E. F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp., 623 F.,
Supp. 1485, 1493 (D. Minn. 1985) (noting the abandonment of the lay observer test);
Hubco Data Prods. Corp. v. Management Assistance Inc., 2 Copyright L. Rep. (CCH)
V 25,529 (D. Idaho Feb. 3, 1983) (relying on expert testimony); Midway Mfg. Co. v.
Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 752-53 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (relying on expert testimony also).
109. Whelan, 154 F.2d at 1233-42. In the final analysis, the Whelan court applied
an idea/expression analysis to determine the copyrightability of the nonliteral elements
of the dental program. Id. The court applied the modified Arnstein test solely to its
determination of substantial similarity. Id. at 1232-33. Under the idea/expression dis-
tinction, Whelan found that DENTCOM had improperly copied the file structure,
screen displays, and certain subroutines of the DENTALAB program. Id. at 1242-48.
The Whelan court, therefore, recognized the copyrightability of the "structure, se-
quence, and organization" of computer software. Id. at 1248.
It is widely accepted that the Whelan opinion, specifically the court's reference to the
"structure, sequence, and organization" of a computer program, has been widely held
as one of the most influential cases regarding copyright for computer software.
110. 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
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SHOP, a computer software printing program."' Soon after selling
500,000 copies of the program, Unison World Inc. (Unison) ap-
proached Broderbund regarding the creation of an IBM version of the
popular program.112 An agreement, however, was never reached.
1" 3
Unison eventually released a very similar program called THE
PRINTMASTER, and Broderbund subsequently sued Unison for in-
fringement under two theories of copyright.'
1 4
Broderbund argued that the screen displays in THE PRINT SHOP
gained copyright protection under the "pictorial or graphic works" sec-
tion of the 1976 Act.11 5 The Broderbund court agreed, finding substan-
tial aesthetic value in the screen displays as a form of expression, and
holding that both the textual and graphical screen representations of
THE PRINT SHOP were copyrightable under a single copyright as a
literary work. 1 6 Additionally, the court affirmed Broderbund's copy-
right infringement claim regarding Unison's sequence, structure, and
organization of THE PRINT SHOP program.117 For the first time in
111. Id. at 1130. THE PRINT SHOP program, designed for the APPLE II com-
puter, produced customized greeting cards, signs, banners, and posters. Id.
112. Id. at 1130-31.
113. Id. When negotiations broke down, however, Unison programmers had al-
ready completed initial development of the IBM version. Id. at 1130-31.
114. Id. at 1131. With the addition of several "advanced" features, and without the
permission of Broderbund, Unison released the IBM version under the name THE
PRINTMASTER. Id. Broderbund subsequently sued Unison for copyright infringe-
ment of the audiovisual displays as well as the sequence, structure, and organization of
THE PRINT SHOP program. Id. at 1134.
115. Id. at 1133 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1977)). Unison countered that the
graphic screens of a computer program fall outside the scope of the 1976 Act. Id. at
1134.
116. Id. at 1133-34. The Broderbund court applied an analysis similar to the use-
ful, functional article component of the idea/expression dichotomy as applied in
Synercom--determining whether the screen displays of THE PRINT SHOP consti-
tuted artistic or utilitarian work. Id.
117. Id. at 1138. The Broderbund court cited a two-part analysis in determining
the existence of copyright infringement. Id. at 1135-36. Copyright infringement may
be established by (1) proof of access and (2) proof of substantial similarity. Id. Under
the "access" test, a court determines whether the alleged infringer possessed a means
of access to the copyrighted work. Id. at 1136. The Broderbund court stated that mere
lack of access to the source or object code, or the literal elements of a computer pro-
gram, nevertheless failed to preclude a lack of access. Id. Under the "substantial simi-
larity" component of the Broderbund two-part test, the court then applied the two-part
Arnstein analysis, using both the "extrinsic" and "intrinsic" considerations. Id. at
1136-37. The court specifically rejected the "modified Arnstein test," or the integrated
substantial similarity test, as applied in Whelan. Id. at 1136.
After setting forth the standards, however, the Broderbund court avoided any copy-
right analysis because of the direct evidence of Unison's copying of the Broderbund
product. Id. at 1135. In fact, Unison admitted copying THE PRINT SHOP in creating
THE PRINTMASTER. Id. See also Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer
Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1245 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984)
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United States copyright history, therefore, a federal district court had
approved as copyrightable the screen display of a computer program.
4. Digital Comms. Assocs., Inc. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp.
In 1987, a Georgia district court, in Digital Communications Associ-
ates, Inc. v. Softklone Distributing Corp.,118 considered a case similar
to Broderbund. In 1983, Microstuff, Inc., later acquired by Digital
Communications Associations, Inc. (Digital), created and marketed
CROSSTALK XVI, 1" 9 an asynchroneous data communications sys-
tem. 120 Realizing the success of CROSSTALK XVI, 21 Foretech De-
velopment Corporation (Foretech) developed MIRROR, a clone of the
successful CROSSTALK XVI. Based upon the substantial similarity of
the interface menus in the programs,'22 as well as the main menu struc-
ture, Digital sued Foretech for copyright infringement of the CROSS-
TALK XVI program.
12 3
The Softklone court completely rejected the Broderbund decision,
concluding that the "copyright protection of a computer program does
not extend to screen displays generated by the program.' 24 Softkione
nevertheless affirmed the infringement action based on the substantial
similarity 125 of the two main menu screens 26 by finding a valid copy-
(describing how Franklin admitted copying the program codes of the APPLE II series
of computers); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 68-70
(detailing how Paperback admitted copying the user interface of LOTUS 1-2-3).
118. 659 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
119. Id. at 452-53. The most distinctive feature of CROSSTALK XVI involves its
"status screen" screen display, or main menu. Id. The main menu involves several dis-
tinctive elements, including a "window" and "command line." Id.
120. Id. at 452. An "asynchroneous data communications system" enables a com-
puter to communicate with other computers via a modem. Id.
121. Id. at 453. CROSSTALK XVI became extremely successful, representing the
benchmark of IBM modem programs.
122. See id. (describing the substantial similarity between the two programs at is-
sue). Although utilizing original programming code and documentation, the MIRROR
computer program included a main menu almost identical to the screen display of
CROSSTALK XVI. Id.
123. Id. at 453-54. Digital possessed three separate copyrights to the CROSS-
TALK XVI program, including a copyright to: (1) the user manual; (2) the computer
program; and (3) the main menu screen. Id.
124. Id. at 455. The court reasoned:
[A] computer program's copyright protection does not extend to the program's
screen displays and that copying of a program's screen displays, without evidence
of copying the program's source code, object code, sequence, organization or
structure, does not state a claim of infringement.
Id. at 456.
125. See id. at 456-64 (presenting a novel approach to the copyright question by
analyzing the separate copyright of a main menu display as a form under the idea/
expression distinction and as a "compilation"). This dual analysis in determining the
copyrightability for the nonliteral elements of a computer program remains quite
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right for CROSSTALK XVI's menu display.1 27 Softklone, however,
failed to resolve the question regarding the copyrightability of user in-
terface within computer software, because neither the Broderbund nor
Softklone courts specifically addressed copyright for the nonliteral
manifestations of computer software.
C. THE LEGAL TESTS FOR THE COPYRIGHTABILITY
OF USER INTERFACE IN COMPUTER SOFTWARE
After the Copyright Act of 1909, Congress delegated interpretative
authority to the federal courts in determining the scope of United
States copyright protection. 28 Under this charge, the federal courts
have created various analytical techniques, or judicial "tests," to inter-
pret the statutory meaning of the copyright laws. 120 The idea/expres-
sion distinction of Synercom, the Arnstein v. Porter test of Whelan, the
substantial similarity tests of Broderbund, and the unique analysis of
Softklone all illustrate the variety of judicial means used to resolve the
copyright question. 30 Clearly, the judicial interpretation of the copy-
right laws in the United States remains anything but uniform.
In Offshore Logistics Inc. v. Tallentire,13' Justice O'Connor outlined
four basic considerations in the judicial interpretation of any statute.1 32
According to Justice O'Connor, these four factors should demonstrate
the basis of copyright law as construed under the 1976 and 1980
Acts. 3' They include: (1) the "provisions of the whole law";'3 (2) the
unique and was dismissed out-of-hand by the Lotus court. See infra notes 163-80 and
accompanying text (describing the legal approach of the Lotus court in determining the
copyrightability of user interface in computer software).
126. See id. at 465 (discussing the similarity between the two screens).
127. Id. The court noted how "the status screen, even if found to be a 'form,'
clearly expresses and conveys information and, therefore, is copyrightable." Id. at 462.
128. See supra notes 76-92 and accompanying text (providing a synopsis of United
States copyright law).
129. See supra notes 93-127 and accompanying text (discussing the variety of legal
tests applied in determining the scope of United States copyright law).
130. Id.
131. 477 U.S. 207 (1986).
132. Id. at 221.
133. Id.
134. Id. The first factor of the O'Connor test involves "the provisions of the whole
law" analysis. Id. (quoting United States v. Heirs of Boisdore, 8 U.S. (1 How.) 113,
122 (1849)). A federal court would find little real assistance in ascertaining the
copyrightability of user interface in a computer program under the "provisions of the
whole law" analysis, as the Lotus decision represents the first case to directly address
this issue. See Edelman, Judge Rules Rival Copied Portion of Lotus' 123, The Boston
Globe, June 29, 1990, at 21 (noting that Lotus was the first case to deal with the
copyrightability of computer interface programs); see also Offshore, 477 U.S. at 221
(citing Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 285 (1956)) (declaring that
"[i]n expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a
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sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law.") (quoting United States v. Heirs
of Boisdore, 8 U.S. (1 How.) 113, 122 (1849)). Moreover, as Apple Computer and
Whelan both demonstrate, all literal and some specific, nonliteral manifestations of a
computer program gain copyright protection. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying
text (describing case law approving the copyright of literal manifestations of computer
software and of the nonliteral structure, sequence, and organization of a computer pro-
gram). With regard to user interface, however, the copyright statutes provide no clear
direction, except perhaps by comparing the scope of copyright for computer software to
other types of "literary works." See infra notes 139-41 (discussing the scope of copy-
right protection afforded to other types of "literary works").
The scope of copyright for musical, dramatic, or motion picture works, for example,
involves more than mere duplication of the text, that is, more than just an infringement
of the literal work. See M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.01 [B], 13-8 (1983)
(explaining that copyright infringement also includes the doctrine of substantial simi-
larity). The substantial similarity doctrine represents the basic ingredient of a copy-
right infringement action, that is, are the two works in question "substantially similar"
to the ordinary observer. See BOORSTYN, supra note 22, at § 10:14, at 291-93 (signify-
ing the doctrine of substantial similarity as the sine qua non of all infringement ac-
tions); see also Just In-Materials Designs, Ltd. v. First Choice Fabrics, Inc., 8
U.S.P.Q.2d 1090, 1091 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (applying the ordinary observer test to a case
of substantial similarity between fabric designs); see generally Dorsen, Satiric Appro-
priation and the Law of Libel, Trademark, and Copyright: Remedies Without Wrongs,
65 B.U.L. REV. 923, 954 (1985) (addressing the scope of the doctrine of substantial
similarity in copyright infringement). Indeed, copyright infringement also occurs if one
work demonstrates a substantial similarity to another work's original expression of set-
ting, characters, or plot. For affirmations that copyright infringement of nonliteral ex-
pression occurs if another work duplicates the expression of an original work of author-
ship through substantial similarity, see Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d
119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931) (emphasizing that copy-
right "cannot be limited literally to the text, else a plagiarist would escape by immate-
rial variations"); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 55 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936) (finding that "a play may be pirated without using
the dialogue"); Detective Comics, Inc. v. Bruns Publications, Inc., Ill F.2d 432, 433
(2d Cir. 1940) (concluding that the comic book "Wonderwoman" infringed upon the
copyright in the comic series "Superman"); Bradbury v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys.,
Inc., 287 F.2d 478, 482-84 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 368 U.S. 801 (1961) (discover-
ing twenty-two nonliteral similarities, and thus copyright infringement, by THE FIRE-
MEN with regard to FAHRENHEIT 451); Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429
F.2d 1106, 1109-11 (9th Cir. 1970) (indicating copyright infringement as a result of
the substantial similarity between certain nonliteral expressive elements embodied in
playing cards); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562
F.2d 1157, 1162-69 (9th Cir. 1977) (finding copyright infringement based on substan-
tially similar characteristics in the locale, characters, and plot of a commercial to a
children's television series); Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc., 715 F.2d
1327, 1329 (9th Cir. 1983) (declaring possible copyright infringement in the similari-
ties between the motion picture "Star Wars" and the motion picture and derivative
television series, "Battlestar Galactica"); Horgan v. Macmillan, Inc., 789 F.2d 157,
163 (2d Cir. 1986) (maintaining a credible copyright dispute regarding the choreogra-
phy of The Nutcracker ballet and a book of substantially similar photographs of the
ballet); Stewart v. Abend, 110 S. Ct. 1750, 1769 (1990) (concluding that a motion
picture may infringe a book by using substantially similar settings, characters, plots,
and sequences of events). Hence, in comparing the scope of copyrightability for "liter-
ary works" to the scope of copyrightability for computer software, a clear parallel ex-
ists between the copyright of a theatrical setting, character, or plot and a computer
program's structure, sequence, and organization. See Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow
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"will of Congress";15 (3) the "object and policy"; 38 and (4) the "im-
Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1242-48 (relating the substantial similarity
doctrine to computer software). On the other hand, all courts have not accepted this
premise. See NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1177, 1178-80 (N.D. Cal.
1989) (rejecting the substantial similarity argument for the copy of a microprocessor
because of the limited range of possible expression); Frybarger v. Int'l Bus. Mach.
Corp., 812 F.2d 525, 529-30 (9th Cir. 1987) (rejecting the substantial similarity argu-
ment for the copyrightability of two video games because of the limited range of possi-
ble expression).
135. Offshore, 477 U.S. at 221. The second factor of the O'Connor test considers
the intent of the statute as demonstrated by the "will of Congress"; that is, the legisla-
tive history of the Act. Id. In determining the scope of copyright for computer
software, however, this aspect seems improbable under the Copyright Act of 1976 be-
cause the Act does not mention computer software. See supra notes 80-127 and accom-
panying text (discussing the scope of computer software copyright protection under
federal statute and federal case law). Moreover, as a result of Congress' essentially
verbatim adoption of the CONTU Report in the Computer Software Act of 1980, little
evidence of actual congressional intent exists. See supra notes 80-92 and accompanying
text (discussing the history of CONTU and the basis of the 1980 Act).
Faced with this complete absence of legislative history for computer software copy-
right, some courts have adopted the minutes of CONTU as the applicable legislative
history. See, e.g., Micro-Sparc, Inc. v. Amtype Corp., 592 F. Supp. 33, 35 n.7 (D.
Mass. 1984) (applying the CONTU Report as authority for legislative history); Mid-
way Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 750 n.6 (N.D. 111. 1983) (using the
CONTU Report as authority for legislative history); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula
Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 524-25 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing the CONTU Report as author-
ity for legislative history); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d
1240, 1251 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984) (deeming the
CONTU Report as authority for legislative history). Although CONTU considered a
variety of issues surrounding the copyrightability of computer software, neither the fi-
nal report nor the committee history addressed the copyrightability of user interface.
Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1241. In addition, the most recent federal decisions on computer
software copyright have completely rejected the use of CONTU as applicable legisla-
tive history. See Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 54 (declaring that "courts must not treat the
CONTU Report as legislative history"); Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1240-42 (finding no evi-
dence that the CONTU Report represents the will of Congress).
136. Offshore, 477 U.S. at 221. The third part of the O'Connor test regards the
"object and policy" of the statute. Id. The object and policy behind United States
copyright law is the ultimate goal of stimulating artistic creativity for the general pub-
lic good. See Harper & Row Pubs., Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985)
(warning that copyright seeks not to reward authors and inventors but to serve the
public welfare by encouraging new and innovative ideas); Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432, reh'g denied, 465 U.S. 1112 (1984)
(recognizing that the ultimate aim of copyright entails the stimulation of artistic crea-
tivity for the general public good) (citing Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127
(1932)); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219, reh'g denied, 347 U.S. 949 (1954) (recog-
nizing that the encouragement of authors and inventors to quest for personal gain con-
stitutes he best means to advance the public welfare); see also Twentieth Century
Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (declaring that "[tihe immediate
effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an 'author's' creative labor. But
the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general
public good"); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (concluding that
"[tihe sole interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the mo-
nopoly [of copyright] lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of
authors"). At the same time, by granting an author the monopoly of copyright protec-
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portance of uniformity.' 3 7 The O'Connor test, however, does not en-
compass the copyrightability of user interface in computer software be-
tion, the copyright laws also seek to encourage authors to generate new ideas, and
similarly to feel free to share those ideas with the public. See Sony Corp. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429, reh'g denied, 465 U.S. 1112 (1984) (stating that
United States copyright law "is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors
and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the
products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired"). To
facilitate this cooperation between the author and the public, Congress protects the
work of the author, and the author simultaneously gains a means by which he or she
may reap a monetary or existential reward. Copyright thus advances, and likewise bal-
ances, these two important "objects and policies": the benefit of the public welfare and
the reward to the author or inventor.
In the judicial interpretation of the United States copyright laws, courts have coun-
terbalanced these two aspects of copyright. This balancing obligation was initially de-
fined by the Supreme Court in Baker v. Seldan, 101 U.S. 99 (1879). In Baker, the
court determined that the text of a book explaining a special method of accounting
constituted copyrightable expression, but that the actual accounting method equated an
idea and thus maintained no copyrightable status. Id. at 105-06. This idea/expression
dichotomy relied on the distinction between a noncopyrightable idea and copyrightable
expression. See Comment, Manufacturers Technology Inc. v. Cams, Inc.-The Legal
Fiction Created by a Single Copyright Registration of a Computer Program and its
Display Screens, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 536, 547-50 (1990) (discussing the diffi-
culty by which courts have applied the nebulous idea/expression distinction). The au-
thor of the Comment states:
The idea/expression dichotomy is best understood by reviewing Professor Nim-
mer's example of Shakesphere's 'Romeo and Juliet.' In that work, the 'idea' is a
romance 'between members of two hostile families.' This idea is not protected by
copyright. However, the story line, dialogue, setting and characterization are all
expressions of the idea and are protected by copyright.
Id. at 543 n.54 (quoting M. Nimmer, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A] (1989)).
This idea/expression dichotomy illustrates the core issue in ascertaining whether the
nonliteral manifestations of a computer software program, such as the user interface,
gain copyrightable status. See CONTU Report, supra note 88, at 54, 57 (recognizing
that the expressive elements of computer software programs gain copyrightable status
but not the ideas, processes, and methods embodied in the programs). CONTU cited
the importance of the idea/expression distinction and the difficulty in such decisions.
Id. at 37-46. See also Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 68 (applying the idea/expression distinc-
tion to the question of copyright for user interface, as opposed to the more common
"look and feel" doctrine).
137. Offshore, 477 U.S. at 221. The fourth aspect of the O'Connor test describes
the importance of judicial uniformity in statutory interpretation. Id.; see Lotus, 740 F.
Supp. at 18 (applying only the first three of O'Connor's four part test of statutory
interpretation). Prior to Lotus, no other federal court had specifically addressed the
question of copyright for the user interface of computer software. With regard to copy-
right for the broader issues regarding nonliteral manifestations, the decisions have been
mixed. Compare Synercom Tech., Inc. v. Univ. Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003,
1012-14 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (rejecting copyright for the "order and sequence" of a com-
puter program) with Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp.
1127, 1131-34 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (approving copyright for the screen formats of a com-
puter program) and Digital Comms. Assocs., Inc. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F.
Supp. 449, 454-57 (N.D. Ga. 1987) (rejecting copyright for the status screen under a
computer program copyright but approving copyrightability of the subject matter
under the screen display copyright).
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cause the test requires precedent upon which to establish the relevance
of statutory authority.
Prior to the Lotus decision, the "look and feel" test represented the
theory which described the predominate copyright analysis for cases of
computer software copyright infringement."' This "look and feel" de-
termination is analagous to a similar concept pertaining to the nonlit-
eral aspects of musical, dramatic, or motion picture works, or the "total
concept and feel" test.""9 Under this determination, a court considers
whether one musical, dramatic, or motion picture work has infringed
upon the total concept and feel of another work by comparing setting,
characters, plot, and other essential components of the specific work in
question. 140 Significantly, ample case law exists by which a court may
decide the total concept and feel of two or more similar musical, dra-
matic, or motion picture works. 14 Only limited federal precedent ex-
ists, however, to adjudge the "look and feel" doctrine. As a result, the
Lotus court designed a new, yet comprehensive, test to determine when
the elements of one computer program have infringed upon the copy-
rightable elements of another.
1 42
III. LOTUS DEV. CORP. v. PAPERBACK SOFTWARE INT'L
In Lotus, Judge Robert E. Keeton considered a variety of copyright
tests to determine the scope of copyright protection for the user inter-
138. See Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1246-47 (determining that copyright protection ex-
tends to the audiovisual displays of a computer program, or overall "look and feel" of
the work); Telemarketing Resources v. Symantec Corp., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1991, 1993
(N.D. Cal. 1989) (extending copyright protection to user interface as embodied in pull-
down menus, but not determining substantial similarity between the two programs).
139. 3 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIbtMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A][l] (1989).
See Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970)
(basing substantial similarity on the "total concept and feel" of the work); Sid &
Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1167 (9th Cir. 1977)
(including the "total concept and feel" analysis as a component of the substantial simi-
larity standard).
140. See National Theme Prods., Inc. v. Jerry B. Beck, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 1348,
1352-56 (S.D. Cal. 1988) (establishing copyright infringement under the total concept
and feel test based on costume design); Barris/Fraser Enters. v. Goodson-Todman En-
ters., Ltd., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1887, 1888 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding copyright infringement
of a game show under the "total concept and feel" test based on original selection,
organization, and presentation as well as the format, appearance, structure, or essence);
Chuck Blore & Don Richman, Inc. v. 20/20 Advertising, Inc., 674 F. Supp. 671, 679-
80 (D. Minn. 1987) (recognizing the copyright infringement of a television commercial
based on the rapid-edit and close-up techniques).
141. See supra notes 139-41 (describing the cases which have applied the "total
concept and feel" test to copyright infringement claims of musical, dramatic, or motion
picture works).
142. See infra notes 163-80 and accompanying text (describing the Lotus test, or
the modified Baker test).
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face in computer software.14 3 In the end, however, Judge Keeton ap-
plied a three-part idea/expression copyright test based upon the Su-
preme Court case of Baker v. Seldan.1" Under this unique test, the
Lotus court ruled that copyright protection does in fact extend to the
user interface of computer software. 
1 4
A. THE FACTS
In 1978, a first-year Harvard Business School student named Daniel
Bricklin invented the first electronic spreadsheet program called VISI-
CALC.146 While VISICALC 141 initially reaped great commercial suc-
cess,' 48 the program (originally designed solely for the APPLE II com-
puter) remained severely limited both in function and flexibility. 49 In
1981, when Bricklin developed a new version of VISICALC for the
IBM PERSONAL COMPUTER (PC), the program still failed to fully
exploit all the capabilities of the IBM PC.'50
143. 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990). Composing a comprehensive opinion, Judge
Keeton's decision provides extensive background on the history of United States copy-
right law, the development of copyright protection for computer software, the scope of
computer software copyright, the history and success of Lotus and the LOTUS 1-2-3
program, and a detailed analysis regarding every aspect of the Lotus claim of copyright
infringement against Paperback's VP-PLANNER. To adequately study Judge Kee-
ton's significantly detailed opinion, this Note addresses each of these considerations in
turn.
144. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
145. See infra notes 160-97 and accompanying text (explaining the rationale and
analysis of the Lotus court's decision).
146. See The Smash Hit of Software, TIME, Mar. 2, 1981, at 68 (explaining the
history of VISICALC); Software's Greatest Hits, FORTUNE, June 29, 1981, at 86 (dis-
cussing the success of VISICALC).
147. See Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 65-68 (providing a history and description of the
evolution of the United States electronic spreadsheet industry). As the first electronic
spreadsheet program ever invented, VISICALC employed a number of processes which
subsequent electronic spreadsheets have also utilized. Id. at 65. All electronic spread-
sheets, for example, employ the rotated "L" screen display with either letters or num-
bers designating the rows and columns of the spreadsheet; the slash key ("/") to invoke
the command choices; the "two-line moving-cursor menu" to access commands; and the
placement of the command choices either above or below the spreadsheet form. Id. One
significant exception includes Microsoft's EXCEL for Apple's MACINTOSH com-
puter which utilizes pull-down menus. Id.; see also Note, Single Copyright Registra-
tion for Computer Programs: Outdated Perceptions Byte the Dust, 54 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 965, 979-81 nn.62-73 (1988) (considering and comparing LOTUS 1-2-3 to VP-
PLANNER and THE TWIN).
148. See How Programmers Get Rich, TIME, Dec. 13, 1982, at 56 (describing how,
in only three years, over 400,000 copies of VISICALC were sold at $495 a piece).
149. See Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 65 (discussing the limitations of the VISICALC
program as designed for the APPLE II computer); see also J. GRUSHCOW, VISICALC
EXTENSIONS FOR THE APPLE II AND APPLE IIE v-vi (1984) (describing the applications
of VISICALC for the APPLE II and APPLE lie computers).
150. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 66.
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Realizing the need for a more powerful and flexible electronic
spreadsheet program for the PC, Mitchell Kapor and Jonathan Sachs
in 1982 created and authored the original version of LOTUS 1-2-3.118
The original program utilized many of the ideas from VISICALC1e2
but organized and processed them in an entirely different way.le 3 The
LOTUS 1-2-3 spreadsheet program soon became the benchmark of all
IBM PC spreadsheet programs.'" As with most successful products,
other software developers attempted to benefit from the success of the
LOTUS 1-2-3 spreadsheet program.155 Two of these developers subse-
quently released 1-2-3 clones: Paperback Software International re-
leased VP-PLANNER and Mosaic Software released THE TWIN.5 6
Neither VP-PLANNER nor THE TWIN copied the program code of
the original 1-2-3 product, but both spreadsheet programs functioned in
exactly the same manner as LOTUS 1-2-3.11o
Subsequently, Lotus sued both Paperback and Mosaic, claiming
copyright infringement of LOTUS 1-2-3.118 Significantly, Lotus as-
serted that VP-PLANNER and THE TWIN violated the copyright of
the program's user interface (i.e., the nonliteral elements of the com-
puter program) rather than the copyright of the actual LOTUS 1-2-3
program (i.e., the literal program code).1 9
B. THE HOLDING
The Lotus court followed a structured analysis in considering Lotus'
copyright infringement claims against Paperback, focusing initially
upon the similarities and differences between the VP-PLANNER and
LOTUS 1-2-3 spreadsheet programs.100 In the final analysis, however,
151. See P. Petre, The Man Who Keeps the Bloom on Lotus, FORTUNE, June 10,
1985, at 136 [hereinafter Petre] (describing the creation and success of the LOTUS 1-
2-3 program).
152. Id. at 138.
153. See Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 67 (differentiating between VISICALC's use of
letter command prompts with LOTUS 1-2-3's use of full-word prompts).
154. See Petre, supra note 151, at 140 (reporting that LOTUS 1-2-3 accounts for
some sixty percent of the computer industry's spreadsheet industry).
155. See Bane, No Letup in Spreadsheet Battles, Chic. Trib., Nov. 18, 1990, at C4
[hereinafter Bane] (discussing the rise of Lotus' competition in the IBM spreadsheet
market, especially with Paperback, Microsoft, and Borland International).
156. See Petre, supra note 151, at 140 (noting the release of two 1-2-3 clones, VP-
PLANNER by Paperback and THE TWIN by Mosiac).
157. See VP-PLANNER MANUAL 1.11 (1985) (explaining to the purchaser the
ease with which VP-PLANNER works, due to its "feature-for-feature" likeness to LO-
TUS 1-2-3).
158. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 75.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 65-68. In Lotus, the court first considered the copyright of an electronic
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a single issue remained: whether the user interface of a computer pro-
gram gains copyrightable status under the copyright law.161 Rejecting a
series of precedent copyright tests to resolve this issue, the Lotus court
chose instead to form a test uniquely designed to consider the particu-
larities of computer software.1
62
1. The Modified Baker Test
The Lotus test for the copyrightability of user interface in computer
software (the modified Baker test) entails two primary levels of analy-
sis. '6 Three questions comprise the first level: (1) whether the original
spreadsheet program with regard to the historical scope of copyright protection for
computer software. Id. at 65. The court concluded that the concept of an electronic
spreadsheet involves an obvious idea and thus precludes copyrightability. Id. Second,
by finding that more than one way exists to create an original method of expressing the
electronic spreadsheet concept, the court established the copyrightability of the elec-
tronic spreadsheet program. Id. at 67-68. Finally, the court turned to the possibility of
copyright infringement of the nonliteral aspects of an electronic spreadsheet program;
specifically, the copyright infringement claim of the user interface of the LOTUS 1-2-3
program by VP-PLANNER. Id. at 68.
161. See id. at 65 (stating the issue as "whether Lotus 1-2-3 does go beyond those
details essential to any expression of the idea, and includes substantial elements of
expression, distinctive and original, which are thus copyrightable").
162. Id. at 65-75.
163. The methodology of the Lotus court's test of copyright for the user interface
of computer software entails the largest portion of the opinion. Although encompassing
the factors of the Synercom, Whelan, Broderbund, and Softklone tests of copyright,
Lotus rejects any preexisting copyright test for user interface. Id. at 61-62. This section
outlines the multi-factored test and identifies the most important aspects.
In general, a schematic of the Lotus test of copyright would appear as follows:
Lii
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work of authorship (that is, the original computer program) represents
a noncopyrightable useful article;16' (2) whether the work represents a
noncopyrightable functional article; 1 5 and, most importantly, (3)
whether the work constitutes a noncopyrightable idea or copyrightable
expression under the Baker v. Seldan idea/expression distinction.0 0
Citing the uncertain meaning of "useful," "functional," and "useful,
functional article,"16 the Lotus court found both technical and statu-
164. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 55-58. Previous cases have used the "useful or func-
tional article" method of copyright analysis in delinating the scope of copyright protec-
tion. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217-19 (1954) (precluding copyright protection
for the useful, functional article); Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co.,
834 F.2d 1142, 1146 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding a bicycle rack a useful, functional article,
yet noting that "a copyrighted work . . . does not lose its protected status merely be-
cause it is subsequently put to functional use"); NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., 645 F.
Supp. 590, 595 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (holding that microprocessors do not lose copyright
protection when distributed to the public even when copyright notification is absent
from the product). See also infra note 167 (discussing the "useful" and/or "func-
tional" article distinction).
165. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 58. See also infra note 167 (discussing the "useful"
and/or "functional" article distinction).
166. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 58-60. For more information on the idea/expression
distinction, also referred to as the process-expression, method-expression, and useful-
expressive distinction, see Determining the Scope of Copyright Protection, supra note
88, at 866 (arguing that the legislative history to the Copyright Act of 1976 envisioned
a predominant role for the idea/expression dichotomy).
167. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 54-58. The first two components of the first level of the
Lotus test represent the same concept: that is, whether a particular original work of
authorship represents a noncopyrightable "useful" or "functional" article. Id.
The Lotus court considered different approaches in interpreting the various meanings
of "useful," "functional," "article," and "useful article" or "functional article" by ad-
dressing each of Paperback's arguments and defenses with regard to the useful-func-
tional article distinction. In the first supposition, Paperback argued:
A 'useful article' is not copyrightable; a 'computer program' is an 'article,' and a
good 'computer program' is 'useful'; therefore, a good 'computer program' is not
copyrightable.
Id. at 56.
Lotus established that the Computer Software Act of 1980 clearly deemed this first
supposition invalid. In supposition two, the court then theorized that, following supposi-
tion one, Paperback would also argue:
A 'useful article' is not copyrightable; a 'screen display' is an 'article,' and a good
'screen display' is 'useful'; therefore, a good 'screen display' is not copyrightable.
Id. at 57.
The court determined, however, that the usage of "article" under supposition two
was beyond the statutory meaning. Finally, in supposition three, the court set forth the
most likely argument to follow supposition two:
A 'useful article' is not copyrightable; a 'user interface' is an 'article,' and a good
'user interface' is 'useful'; therefore, a good 'user interface' is not copyrightable.
Id.
Based upon the same reasoning as in supposition two, however, the Lotus court
found the description of "user interface" as entirely outside the scope of the statutory
meaning of "useful" or "functional article." Id. In other words, Lotus refused Paper-
back's implicit premise that anything and everything useful represents a useful article.
The court thus concluded:
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tory limitations to the concept of the useful, functional article.10 8 The
court noted that in some cases defendants in copyright infringement
suits'69 had attempted to abuse and exploit the distinction,'170 and thus
rejected the concept in considering the copyrightability of user inter-
face.1 71 Instead, the court relied entirely upon the third question of the
first level of analysis, or the idea/expression dichotomy.1
72
It may be quite true, with respect to "useful articles" - indeed I believe it to be
so - that their utilitarian aspects are not copyrightable, and that things that
merely utter work, such as the cam of a drill, are not copyrightable. It is not
true, however, that every aspect of a user interface that is "useful" is therefore
not copyrightable.
Id.
168. Id. at 54-58. The 1976 Act defines a useful, functional article as, "an article
having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of
the article or to convey information." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). Examples of a useful,
functional article include the double-entry method of a T-accounts accounting system,
the "H" pattern of a standard 4-speed transmission, the assignment of letters and num-
bers on a QWERTY keyboard, and the configuration of controls on a musical instru-
ment. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 55. Under the 1980 Act, moreover, Congress specifically
rejected copyright protection for the useful, functional article. Id. at 54. The Lotus
court inferred that Congress had rejected, by its approval of the CONTU Report in the
1980 Act, any possibility of an entire computer program serving as a useful, functional
article. Id. at 53-54. See CONTU Report, supra note 88, at 58-60 (rejecting the useful,
functional article distinction in the copyrightability of computer software); but see id.
at 57-58 (Hersey, C., dissenting) (describing how Commissioner Hersey supported the
concept of a useful, functional and thus noncopyrightable computer program).
169. See Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222, 1238 (3d
Cir. 1986) (demonstrating little difficulty in establishing the utilitarian purpose of a
dental program). In Whelan, the Pennsylvania district court questioned any court's
ability to ajudge a work of literature or visual representation as either a copyrightable
or noncopyrightable useful, functional article. Id. Whelan cited as examples the impos-
sibility of ascertaining the usefulness or function of a novel, poem, sculpture, or paint-
ing. Id.
170. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 55. Initially, the Lotus court applied the useful, func-
tional article distinction to the copyrightability of user interface. Id. at 57-58. Finding
the analysis lacking, the court rejected the doctine's premises. Id. at 58. Paperback had
attempted to convince the court that "[alnything that is useful is a 'useful article';
nothing about a 'useful article' is ever copyrightable; because 1-2-3 is useful, and is an
article, it is not copyrightable." Id. at 56. The Lotus court completely rejected this
argument, noting that mere usefulness or functionality-whether embodied in a dic-
tionary, map, or computer program-fails automatic disqualification under the useful,
functional article distinction: "the statute does not bar copyrightability merely because
the originality of the expression becomes associated, in the marketplace, with the use-
fulness of the work to a degree and in dimensions not previously achieved by other
products on the market." Id. at 58 (citing Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber
Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1147 (2d Cir. 1987)).
171. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 58. Finding the seemingly unlimited interpretations of
the useful, functional article classification unacceptable, the Lotus court concluded that
"elements of expression, even if embodied in useful articles, are copyrightable if capa-
ble of identification and recognition independently of the functional ideas that make
the article useful." Id. at 58. (Emphasis added.)
172. Id. at 58-62. The idea/expression distinction is the focus of the Lotus test of
copyright for the nonliteral manifestations of computer software. Based on authority
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Baker v. Seldan17 3 first articulated the rule that copyright exists to
protect expression, but not ideas.174 The exact boundary between an
idea and an original expression of an idea nevertheless remains elu-
sive.17 5 Based on Baker v. Seldan and its progeny, the Lotus court for-
mulated a second level of analysis to ascertain more fully the scope of
the idea/expression distinction. Under this second level, the court ap-
plied a four-part test, considering: (1) originality;1 76 (2) usefulness or
from the Copyright Act of 1976, the Computer Software Copyright Act of 1980, prece-
dent case law, and even the committee discussions of CONTU, the Lotus court formu-
lated an idea/expression test specifically designed to adjudge the copyrightability of
user interface in computer software. Id.
173. 101 U.S. 99 (1879). In Baker, Seldan had received a copyright on the book.
"Seldan's Condensed Ledger, or Bookkeeping Simplified," which explained a new sys-
tem of accounting. Id. at 101. The book also contained a number of blank forms which
were relevant to the new accounting procedure. The copyright dispute arose over the
sale of Baker's accounting books using the same accounting method and the same
blank forms. Although both Baker and Seldan agreed that the system of accounting
was not copyrightable, Seldan argued that the blank forms were included in the copy-
rightable text of the book and Baker's use of the forms equated copyright infringement.
Id. The Supreme Court, however, disagreed. Finding the system of accounting a
noncopyrightable idea, the Court rationalized that components of that system would
merely compose an extension of the idea and not represent copyrightable -dxpression.
Id. at 107.
174. Id. at 103-04. The idea/expression distinction reflects the purpose of the copy-
right law-to benefit the public welfare. Ideas and scenes a faire preclude copyright-
able work because such a status would grant a virtual monopoly to the copyright
holder. See Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 489
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984) (warning of the monopoly on the "com-
monplace ideas behind the scenes a faire if granted copyright"); see also Atari, Inc. v.
N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 616 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 880 (1982) (describing scenes a faire as "incidents, characters, or settings which
are as a practical matter indispensable .. . in the treatment of a given topic");
Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 841 (1980) (stating that "it is virtually impossible to write about a particular
historical era or fictional theme without employing certain 'stock' or standard literary
devices, we have held that scenes a faire are not copyrightable as a matter of law").
175. See Nichols v. Univeral Picture Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert.
denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931) (recognizing, in a copyright infringement case, that no-
body has been able to set the exact boundary between the idea and the expression of
the idea); Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir.
1960) (explaining that the test for copyright infringement is necessarily vague due to
the subjectivity involved when a court decides when an idea has become an actual
expression).
176. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 58. The "originality" of the expression of an idea de-
pends solely upon whether the form of expression originated with the author. 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) (1988). Only the "'original' work of authorship" gains copyright protection
via the expression and not the idea. Id. Original works entail, however, more than the
mere novel or unique: under the statutory meaning, an original work includes any work
independently created by an author even to the slightest degree. See Stuff v. La Budde
Feed & Grain Co., 42 F. Supp. 493, 495 (E.D. Wis. 1941) (stating that "original"
means that the author applied "skill, labor, or judgment"); Dorsey v. Old Surety Life
Ins. Co., 98 F.2d 872, 873-74 (10th Cir. 1938) (finding that when an author adds to
previously uncopyrighted materials, those portions which are the result of his own labor
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functionality; 177 (3) obviousness; 178 and (4) the doctrine of merger'7
for the work or works in question. 80
may be copyrightable); see also Amplex Mfg. Co. v. A.B.C. Plastic Fabrications, Inc.,
184 F. Supp. 285, 287 (E.D. Pa. 1960) (considering originality in the slightest degree
sufficient to constitute a copyrightable work).
177. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 58. The "usefulness" or "functionality" of a means of
expression depends on the number of additional ways in which the same method of
expression may occur. This consideration, of course, is the useful, functional article
distinction. See supra notes 164-68 (describing fully the useful, functional article dis-
tinction). As noted earlier, a strictly utilitarian work gains no copyright protection.
Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222, 1238-39 (3d Cir. 1986).
However, if the expression represents a work of significant creativity and originality,
even if constituting a useful or functional article, the availability of copyright persists.
Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 58.
178. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 58-59. The "obviousness" factor of defined expression
represents the prohibition of copyright protection for a statement of the obvious. See E.
H. Tate Co. v. Jiffy Enter., Inc., 16 F.R.D. 571, 573 (E.D. Pa. 1954) (ruling that an
instruction, "apply hook to wall," constituted a statement of the obvious and failed to
qualify as copyrightable expression). The obviousness of a work directly relates to the
idea/expression distinction, in that an obvious work constitutes a noncopyrightable
idea. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 59. As the Lotus court noted, "[w]hen a particular expres-
sion goes no farther than the obvious, it is inseparable from the idea itself." Id. at 58-
59.
179. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 58-59. The "merger" concept prohibits the copyright
of expression when there are only a limited number of procedural options. See Morris-
sey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir. 1967) (stating that the
copyright of expression which seeks to describe a subject matter of limited forms of
presentation improperly seizes that form of expression from public use). See e.g., Con-
crete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 606 (1st Cir. 1988)
(explaining that "[w]hen there is essentially only one way to express an idea, the idea
and its expression are inseparable and copyright does not bar to copying that expres-
sion"); Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir.
1971) (deciding that the idea of a jewel-encrusted life-like bee pin is inseparable from
expression and not copyrightable because "protecting the 'expression' in such circum-
stances would confer a monopoly of the 'idea' upon the copyright owner."). But see
Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 616 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982) (noting that scenes afaire, such as incidents, charac-
ters, or settings, are not copyrightable) (citing Alexander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40, 45
(S.D.N.Y. 1985)); Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d
485, 489 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984) (recognizing that copyright for
scenes a faire "would give the first author a monopoly on the commonplace ideas").
The merger doctrine, therefore, prohibits the copyright of works in which the work and
the idea are inseparable. See Baker v. Seldan, 101 U.S. 99, 101-02 (1879) (holding
that the new system of accounting "merged" with the blank forms and thus rendered
the forms noncopyrightable). Without the merger doctrine, copyright would prohibit all
possibility of future use of any specific idea. Realizing the danger of this monopoly and
thus recognizing the importance of merger, the Lotus court warned that courts "cannot
recognize copyright as a game of chess in which the public can be checkmated." Lotus,
740 F. Supp. at 59 (quoting Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 679
(Ist Cir. 1967)).
180. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 58-59. Judge Keeton used these four factors of the
second level of analysis in his consideraton of the idea/expression distinction in arriving
at a definitive solution to the question of copyright for the nonliteral manifestations of
computer software. Judge Keeton, however, also cites yet another approach to the
idea/expression diachotomy. Id. at 59-62. In the three-part "elements of the legal test
LOTUS DEV. CORP.
The Lotus court applied this modification of the Baker v. Seldan test
(a "modified Baker test") to establish copyrightability for the user in-
terface of computer software. It analyzed VISICALC versus LOTUS
1-2-3 to establish the standard for user interface copyright, and then it
compared LOTUS 1-2-3 with VP-PLANNER to decide the copyright
infringement issue.
2. Copyright Test: VISICALC v. LOTUS 1-2-3
To satisy the "originality" prong, the Lotus court found that both
VISICALC and LOTUS 1-2-3 utilize sufficiently different means of
"structure, appearance, and method of operation" to express the elec-
tronic spreadsheet program idea.18 1 The court noted that the authors of
1-2-3 had implemented substantial improvements to their version of the
electronic spreadsheet as compared to the original VISICALC pro-
gram.182 Furthermore, the court found that LOTUS 1-2-3's unique fea-
tures sufficiently distinguished it from the VISICALC program. 183 As
for copyrightability" analysis, a more theoretical approach to the idea/exprcssion dis-
tinction, Judge Keeton explains that a judicial decision-maker must first formulate a
definition of "idea" which distinguishes between the generalized and specific aspects of
ideas and expressions. Id. Second, the decision-maker must differentiate between the
essential and the nonessential components of an author's expression to identify whether
the means of presentation force a limitation on a finite range of methods to communi-
cate the idea. Id. Third, after discerning the nonessential components of an author's
expression, the decision-maker must ascertain whether those elements of expression
compose a substantial part of the copyrightable work. Id. Judge Keeton's three-prongcd
"elements of the legal test for copyrightability" analysis thus implicates: (1) general
versus specific means of expression; (2) essential versus nonessential details of expres-
sion; and (3) the substantiality of the work's nonessential components. Id. Within the
Lotus decision, which is inundated with tests and analyses, Judge Keeton applies this
"special test" in an attempt to clarify the uncertainty surrounding the idea/expression
distinction. Id.
181. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 65. For example, LOTUS 1-2-3 utilizes a more user-
friendly multi-level command tree main menu structure than VISICALC, provides for
function keys, and includes macro capabilities. Id. at 67.
182. Id. The substantial improvements on the VISICALC program by LOTUS 1-
2-3 parallels the same type of improvements made by Microsoft's EXCEL on the 1-2-3
program. See infra note 184 (describing the EXCEL program).
183. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 65-68. The court emphasized the variety of original
mechanisms in the LOTUS 1-2-3 program by noting:
The idea of a menu structure-including the overall structure, the order of com-
mands in each menu line, the choice of letters, words, or 'symbolic tokens' to
represent each command, the presentation of these symbolic tokens on the screen
(i.e., first letter only, abbreviations, full words, full words with one or more let-
ters capitalized or underlined), the type of menu system used (i.e., one-, two-, or
three-line moving-cursor menus, pull-down menus, or command-driven inter-
faces), and the long prompts--could be expressed in a great many if not literally
unlimited number of ways.
Id. at 67.
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an example, Lotus cited the EXCEL program, a spreadsheet program
different from both the VISICALC and LOTUS 1-2-3 programs.
184
Under the "usefulness" or "functionality" prong, the Lotus court
noted that although electronic spreadsheet programs such as LOTUS
1-2-3 and VISICALC use common features, they are distinguished by
their respective methods of operation.18 5 The court recognized that the
application of common programming components, like the "+" and
...." signs for addition and subtraction, represented useful, functional
articles as opposed to the truly unique features of the 1-2-3 program. 180
Consequently, LOTUS 1-2-3's use of VISICALC's useful, functional
aspects did not result in copyright infringement.
187
Similarly, as the court discounted application of the "obviousness"
factor, the Lotus court rejected any violation of the doctrine of
"merger."'' 88 Because screen displays, menu designs, and other program
formats may be expressed in a number of ways, 18 9 the use of common
terms which may be obvious, or merge with the idea relating to a par-
ticular command term, does not preclude a copyright for the entire
command structure. 90 Therefore, because the authors of LOTUS 1-2-3
utilized only nondistinctive aspects of VISICALC in their program, the
court concluded that merger had not occured and, therefore, that LO-
TUS 1-2-3 had not infringed upon the copyrightable elements of the
VISICALC program.19
184. Id. at 69. Several years after the success of LOTUS 1-2-3, Microsoft Corp.
developed a new and unique spreadsheet program called EXCEL, a spreadsheet pro-
gram entirely different from either VISICALC or LOTUS 1-2-3. See Bane, supra note
155, at C4 (explaining how the graphic user interface for EXCEL depended entirely
upon a mouse for input and command execution, as distinguished with all other elec-
tronic spreadsheet programs).
185. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 66-67. As the original electronic spreadsheet program,
VISICALC was of course the first to apply the rotated "L" screen design, the two-line
moving cursor menu, as well as the use of "+" key for addition, the "-. key for
subtraction, the "*" for multiplication, and the "/" key for division in an electronic
spreadsheet. Id.
186. Id. at 66-67.
187. Id. at 67.
188. See id. (stating that the usefulness or functionality of the rotated "L" screen
design or the alphanumeric key configuration preclude application either of the "obvi-
ousness" or "merger" factors).
189. See supra notes 184 (describing several of the ways by which the same idea of
an electronic spreadsheet program may be expressed).
190. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 67.
191. Id. at 67-68. In applying the final elements of the modified Baker test, the
Lotus court established the copyrightability of user interface if two factors were met.
First, the court considered whether the aspect in question constitutes a distinctive detail
of the computer program. Id. Second, the court considered whether the aspect involved
the only means to express the idea. Id. If the answer to both questions were in the
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By determining the legality of LOTUS 1-2-3 vis-a-vis the copyright-
able aspects of the VISICALC spreadsheet program, the Lotus court
established the copyrightability of user interface in computer
software."9 2 Once established, the court then turned to Lotus' infringe-
ment claim against Paperback's VP-PLANNER.
3. Copyright Test: LOTUS 1-2-3 v. VP-PLANNER
The Lotus court, using the modified Baker test, avoided a lengthy
analysis of whether or not VP-PLANNER infringed upon LOTUS 1-2-
3. This was possible because Paperback admitted copying the LOTUS
1-2-3 user interface in the VP-PLANNER spreadsheet program.1' 3
Citing both the manual for VP-PLANNER19' and testimony from the
affirmative, the nonliteral element of the computer program gained full copyrightable
status. Id.
A schematic of the Lotus test of copyright for the user interface of computer
software would appear as follows:
of Corflvb t I
192. See 1d. at 67 (declaring that "[i]f particular characteristics not distinctive in-
dividually have been brought together in a way that makes the 'whole' a distinctive
expression of an idea - one of many possible ways of expressing it - then the 'whole'
may be copyrightable").193. Id. at 68-70.
194. Id. at 69-70. In relevant part, the manual states:
VP-Planner is designed to work like Lotus 1-2-3, keystroke for keystroke ....
VP-Planner's worksheet is a feature-for-feature workalike for 1-2-3. It doesmacros. It has the same command tree. It allows the same kind of calculations.
the same kind of numerical information. Everything 1-2-3 does, VP-Planner
does.Id. at 69 (quoting VP-PLANNERcMAhNaAL t-eI at xi, d.c1 (1985)).
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original developer of the program,1"5 the court found that Lotus Devel-
opment Corporation had met its requisite burden of proof.'9 6 The Lotus
court thus affirmed the copyrightability of user interface by concluding
that VP-PLANNER had undisputably infringed upon significant ele-




While the main issue of the Lotus decision involved the copyright-
ability of user interface in computer software, Paperback had presented
two defenses to Lotus' infringement claim, asserting that (1) Lotus had
failed to invoke subject matter jurisdiction over the copyright claim be-
cause of a failure to properly register the LOTUS 1-2-3 copyright'0 8
195. Id. at 69. In a court affidavit, Dr. James Stephenson, the original developer of
VP-PLANNER, admitted:
[M]aking the changes required for macro compatibility meant that we had to
revise existing elements of the [VP-Planner spreadsheet interface, including the
hierarchical menu structure; ensure that keystroke sequences would bring about
the same operational result in both programs; add certain functional elements
found in Lotus 1-2-3 which VP-Planner did not yet support; and discard certain
features which, although beneficial, were inconsistent with the macro compatibil-
ity requirement....
Id.
196. See id. at 68 (noting that infringement must be set forth as both overwhelm-
ing and pervasive); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125, 141
n.1 1, 149 (D.N.J. 1982), aff'd, 775 F.2d 70 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1047
(1986) (declaring that a finding of "overwhelming and pervasive" copying supports a
motion for summary judgement in favor of the plaintiff).
197. Id. at 70.
198. Id. at 79-82. An author must register a copyright before he or she may pursue
a copyright infringement action. 17 U.S.C. § 411 (1988). See also Quincy Cablesys-
tems, Inc. v. Sully's Bar, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 838, 850 (D. Mass. 1986) (stating that
copyright registration constitutes a jurisdictional condition precedent to the filing of a
copyright infringement action). Paperback asserted that the copyright infringement
suit was founded upon "screen displays" rather than user interface. Lotus, 740 F.
Supp. at 79. Paperback argued that Lotus registered the literal code of LOTUS 1-2-3
as a literary work, but did not register the screen displays as a separate audiovisual
work, and therefore the jurisdictional prerequisites were not met. Id. at 79.
The Lotus court rejected the separate copyright for screen display argument, repudi-
ating the claim that a screen display gains copyright protection. Id. at 79-81 (citing
Digital Communications Assoc., Inc. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449, 456
(N.D. Ga. 1987)) (deciding that "copyright protection does not extend to the pro-
gram's screen displays, and that copying of a program's screen displays, without evi-
dence of copying of the program's source code, object code, sequence, organization or
structure, does not state a claim of infringement"). Only a screen display which repre-
sents a greater aspect of copyright, such as "sequence, organization or structure" would
enable an infringement action. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 80 (citing Softklone, 659 F.
Supp. at 455-56) (declaring that "copyright protection does not extend to screen dis-
plays generated by the program"). Lotus nevertheless emphasized that its ruling re-
garding the copyrightability of nonliteral manifestations extended not merely to screen
displays or user interface but to the entire structure, sequence, and organization of the
program. Id. The court concluded that Lotus' certificates of copyright registration for
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and that (2) laches and equitable estoppel served as a bar to the copy-
right infringement action. 99 Both of Paperback's attempts to thwart
the entire work of LOTUS 1-2-3 sufficiently extended copyright protection to screen
displays as well as the other nonliteral aspects of the computer program. Id.
The Lotus court moreover rejected the issue of dual registration, that is, registering
the computer program as a literary work and the screen displays as audiovisual works.
The court recognized that, although the copyright office registers different works in
different ways, some works fall under more than one category of copyrightable works.
Id. at 80-81; see COMPENDIUM OF COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 604 (1984)
(describing how the copyright office requires the submission of different forms accord-
ing to the type of copyrightable work); see also id. at § 604 and § 708 (describing how
an author completes the registration certificate for the class most appropriate for the
type of work registered and that registration suffices for the entire work). Because com-
puter programmers have historically registered computer software under the literary
work category, the court found dual registration overly duplicative as set forth by Con-
gress in 1988. See id. at § 702.01 (declaring that computer programs should be regis-
tered as "nondramatic literary works"); see also Registration of Computer Screen Dis-
plays, 53 Fed. Reg. 21,817 (1988) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 202) (stating that the
copyright application for a single computer program may be registered on a single
form); M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 442 (4th Cir. 1986) (finding
that a single registration suffices because, even if registered solely under the audiovisual
category, such registration protects not only the screen displays but also the program
code).
Prior to 1987, Lotus had tried to register the LOTUS 1-2-3 program and screen
displays separately, but the attempt was rejected by the copyright office. Lotus, 740 F.
Supp. at 81. Based on the above findings, the Lotus court thus found proper jurisdic-
tion by Lotus for all aspects of the infringement suit against Paperback. Id. at 82.
199. Citing the doctrines of laches and equitable estoppel, Paperback asserted that
Lotus' fourteen and one-half month delay after the release of VP-PLANNER, before
commencing the litigation, barred a copyright infringement suit. Id. at 82. Because
both doctrines constitute affirmative defenses, however, Paperback maintained the bur-
den of proving either or both doctrines by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.
Laches requires the defendant to show that the plaintiff inexcusably and unreasona-
bly delayed the bringing of an action, and that the delay unduly prejudiced the defend-
ant. See Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 282 (1961) (noting that laches places
the burden on the petitioner to show both "(1) lack of diligence by the party against
whom the defense is asserted, and (2) prejudice to the party asserting the defense");
see also Gardner v. Panama R. R., 342 U.S. 29, 31 (1951) (considering the equities of
the parties); Puerto Rican-Am. Ins. Co. v. Benjamin Shipping Co., 829 F.2d 281, 283
(1st Cir. 1987) (also considering the equities of the parties). The Lotus court deter-
mined that Lotus had neither unduly delayed action against Paperback Software nor
prejudiced the proceedings. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 82. Although Lotus waited over
fourteen months to file an infringement action, the court deemed the delay an act of
prudent business judgment to ascertain the company's legal position. See id. (describ-
ing how Paperback Software released VP-PLANNER on October 30, 1985 but Lotus
waited until January 12, 1987 to bring an infringement action); see also Roulo v. Russ
Berrie & Co., Inc., 886 F.2d 931, 942 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1075
(1990) (describing how one company waited twenty-one months before filing an in-
fringement suit in order to determine the merits of the case).
Equitable estoppel prevents a cause of action where the deeds of one party reasona-
bly lead another party to rely upon those actions to his or her detriment. See Precious
Metals Assocs., Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 620 F.2d 900, 908 (1st
Cir. 1980) (stating that the doctrine of equitable estoppel exists to protect the rights of
those who reasonably rely upon the actions of others). In this second claim for equita-
ble relief, Paperback contended that Lotus' failure to object to VP-PLANNER in a
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the copyright infringement suit nevertheless failed because the court
rejected both equitable defenses.
IV. THE EFFECT OF LOTUS DEV. CORP. v. PAPERBACK
SOFTWARE INT'L ON THE COPYRIGHTABILITY FOR
COMPUTER SOFTWARE USER INTERFACE IN THE
UNITED STATES AS WELL AS IN THE INTERNATIONAL
REALM
Two bodies of opinion effectively encompass and demonstrate the
merits and/or deficiencies of the landmark Lotus decision.200 On one
side, the "copyright minimalists" strive to limit or even eliminate en-
tirely the copyrightability of computer software. 10' The minimalists ar-
gue that a broad interpretation of copyright law serves to stifle compe-
tition in the computer software marketplace. 2  The "copyright
maximalists," on the other hand, laud the importance and strict en-
forcement of the copyright laws.2 0 3 Rejecting any substantial effect on
competition within the computer software industry, the maximalists
strive to secure broad copyrightability for computer software in order
to provide equitable protection for all authors' original work, whatever
the form.
20 4
The debate between the goals of the copyright maximalists and mini-
malists in the United States reflects the international conflicts in deter-
mining the scope of copyright for computer software.20 5 Internationally,
timely manner estopped Lotus from pursuing a copyright infringement claim against
Paperback Software's continued marketing of VP-PLANNER. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at
82. The court likewise rejected the equitable estoppel claim, finding no evidence of
Paperback Software's reliance upon any action or nonaction of Lotus. Id. at 83.
200. See Davis, Airing Both Sides of the "Look and Feel" Debate, COM-
PUTERWORLD, Aug. 13, 1990, at 21 (discussing the fairness versus the compatibility
arguments in the debate over the scope of copyright protection for computer software).
201. See Burke, "Hacker Extraordinaire" Protests Interface Monopolies, PC
WEEK, July 23, 1990, at 136 (citing the opposition of Richard Stallman and the Free
Software Foundation to the Lotus decision and the broad extension of copyright protec-
tion in general).
202. See Richman, Programming Freedom is New Group's Objective, The Wash-
ington Times, Nov. 21, 1990, at C2 (noting the growing debate and disagreement over
the Lotus decision and the general scope of computer software copyright law in the
United States).
203. See Huber, Madonna Ain't Software, FORBES, Sept. 3, 1990, at 104 (agreeing
that the federal courts should rule against software imitators, stating how
"'Swheetheart'[sic] is Bogart, even when growled by some third-rate comedian").
204. See Nanobytes, BYTE, Sept. 1990, at 20 (citing Ashton-Tate's emphatic ap-
proval of the Lotus decision which significantly expanded the scope of copyright law in
the United States).
205. For an overview of the issues surrounding the copyrightability of computer
software and the computer software industry, see Wiegner and Heins, Can Las Vegas
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this debate emphasizes the disparity between the technology "haves"
and "have-nots."2 °6 Most of the industrialized nations presently adhere
to some sort of international agreement, convention, or treaty pertain-
ing to the copyrightability of computer software.207 Nevertheless, any
significant move to expand the scope of international copyright, espe-
cially for the nonliteral aspects of computer programs such as "user
interface," would guarantee an international dispute between the tech-
nologically advanced and less advanced nations. 208
A. THE IDEA/EXPRESSION DISTINCTION VERSUS "THE BRIGHT LINE
TEST"
The primary test of copyrightability in the United States is the
Baker v. Seldan the idea/expression dichotomy.20 9 The Copyright Act
of 1976 codified application of the distinction into judicial copyright
analyses.21 Hence, without the express authority of Congress, United
States federal courts may not ignore or replace the analysis of the
sue Atlantic City?, FORBES, Mar. 6, 1989, at 130 (demonstrating the dominance of
United States companies in the international computer software marketplace). As of
1988, United States companies controlled sixty percent of the S55 billion international
computer software market. Id.
206. For an overview of the issues surrounding the international protection of high-
technology and the development of foreign markets, see generally D. SILVERSrEIN,
PATENT PROTECTION AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN LEss-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES: A
REAPPRAISAL OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR PRODUCING AND TRANSMITTING
KNOWLEDGE (1986) (describing the technology deficit among the less.developed
countries).
207. See STRONG, THE COPYRIGHT BOOK: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 173 (2d ed. 1984)
(outlining the most common international means to copyright protection for the indus-
trialized nations); see also supra notes 31-55 and accompanying text (describing the
various means to international copyright protection and the countries which belong to
the respective agreements, conventions, and treaties).
208. Because of United States, European, and Japanese dominance in high technol-
ogy, specifically in the computer software industry, some foreign countries have refused
to broaden the scope of copyright for computer software. See Six Parties Comment on
Seventeen Countries in Second Round Under Special 301 Provision, Int'l Trade Rep.,
(BNA) No. 9, at 300 (Feb. 28, 1990) (discussing foreign countries with the most egre-
gious intellectual property practices); Hills Removes Taiwan. Korea, Saudi Arabia,
From Priority List, Five Countries Remain, Int'l Trade Rep., (BNA) No. 44, at 1436
(Nov. 8, 1989) (noting egregious foreign practices in intellectual property).
209. See supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text (describing the Baker v.
Seldan test); see also supra notes 93-127 (portraying the approach of the Synercom,
Whelan, Broderbund, and Softklone courts to the test). For the approach of the Lotus
court to the Baker v. Seldan test, or the "modified Baker test," see supra notes 163-80
(describing how the idea/expression distinction applied by the Lotus court resulted not
only from consideration of precedent judicial decision-making but also through an ef-
fort to interpret the important subtleties of United States copyright law).
210. See supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text (setting forth the requirements
and rationale of the Copyright Act of 1976).
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idea/expression dichotomy. 1' On the other hand, the idea/expression
distinction is subject to a wide disparity of interpretation and therein
arises the conflict between the copyright maximalists and the copyright
minimalists. 12
The Lotus decision demonstrates a typical "maximalist" view of
copyright law in the United States.21 3 Addressing the policy issues of
the case, the Lotus court specifically rejected a bright-line rule of copy-
right as bad public policy. 214 Suggesting that the success of the United
States software industry is a direct result of judicial interpretation of
the copyright law, Lotus deemed any bright-line rule incompatible with
the statutorily mandated idea/expression distinction. 15 The court
therefore, concluded that only an evolving and interpretative view of
the copyright law would protect and inspire creativity, 216 for "[i]t is no
accident that the world's strongest software industry is found in the
United States, rather than in some other jurisdiction which provides
weaker protection for computer programs. The system is working, and
there is no reason to change it."'217 According to these copyright maxi-
malists, judicial interpretation inspires creativity within the computer
software industry and thus precludes any role for a bright-line rule of
copyright.
Paperback's position, on the other hand, exemplifies the "minimalist"
view of copyright protection for computer software. 18 Theoretically,
Paperback argued that a bright-line rule of copyright would inspire
211. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 77-78. In Lotus, Judge Keeton recognized that Con-
gress expressed the intention of encouraging creativity and innovation in computer
software through the copyright laws, despite the possible effects on standardization. Id.
at 78; but see Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S. 597 Before the Subcommittee
on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 589 (1967) (testimony of Professor Anthony Oettinger) (arguing
that the extension of copyright to computer programs may have disastrous effects on
standardization).
212. See supra notes 93-127 (describing four federal courts' differing approaches to
the same Baker v. Seldan idea/expression distinction).
213. See supra notes 163-97 and accompanying text (describing the rationale and
analysis behind the Lotus decision).
214. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 73.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 75.
217. Id. (citing Plaintiff's Post-Trial Brief at 87-89); but see M. GEMIGNANI, LAW
AND THE COMPUTER 117 (1981) (referencing the healthy state of the United States
computer software industry prior to the Copyright Act of 1980, and stating: "Some
argue that copyright or patent protection is necessary for the growth of the software
industry. But this industry is growing by leaps and bounds without it.").
218. See supra notes 156-59 (setting forth the position of Paperback with regard to
the copyright issues involved in the Lotus decision).
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standardization which would subsequently encourage creativity. 219 Re-
alistically, however, Paperback's assertions only illustrated a desire to
exploit the noncopyrightable elements of LOTUS 1-2-3,22 0 assertions
merely based upon a "standardization" argument.221 A strict standardi-
zation argument, moreover, requires a clear and defined means by
which to ascertain the "standard" in the market. 2 Prior to the Lotus
decision, no judicial test existed by which this determination could be
made.223 The Lotus court nevertheless rejected Paperback's standardi-
zation argument,224 thereby recognizing the failure of the bright-line
rule of copyright.225
Not surprisingly, both the copyright maximalists as well as the mini-
malists find support for their prospective positions internationally. 226
Unfortunately, the division of views has taken place strictly along the
lines of technological and, therefore, economic development. 227 As op-
posed to the developed maximalist nations, the lesser developed mini-
219. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 77-78. The standardization argument upon which Pa-
perback relied depends upon the status of a product as the leader or "benchmark" in
the market, for example, LOTUS 1-2-3 as the benchmark of electronic spreadsheet
programs for the IBM PC. Describing LOTUS 1-2-3 as a benchmark among spread-
sheet programs, Paperback argued that any other electronic spreadsheet must be one
hundred percent compatible with LOTUS 1-2-3 in order to fairly compete in the elec-
tronic spreadsheet marketplace. Id. at 78; see also infra notes 244-48 and accompany-
ing text (defining the contrasting positions of creativity versus standardization in the
computer software industry).
220. Id.
221. See also Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 709 F. Supp. 925, 929-30
(1989) (describing how Microsoft Corporation and the Hewlett-Packard Company
presented the standardization argument regarding their copying of the user interface of
Apple's MACKINTOSH line of computers).
222. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 78.
223. See supra notes 93-127 and accompanying text (describing the various ap-
proaches in determining the scope of computer software copyright).
224. Id. Had a bright-line rule existed to determine the standard of copyright for
user interface prior to Lotus (i.e. the scope of copyright for the LOTUS 1-2-3 pro-
gram), Paperback would have utilized one hundred percent of those noncopyrightable
elements of LOTUS 1-2-3 in VP-PLANNER. Id.
225. For another example of the failure of the "standardization inspires creativity"
argument, see Digital Comms. Assocs., Inc. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp.
449, 453 (N.D. Ga. 1987) (describing how Foretech sought legal counsel regarding the
exact scope of copyright protection for CROSSTALK XVI and thenafter how all
noncopyrightable elements were subsequently utilized in the functional clone copy, or
the MIRROR program).
226. See 3 S. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS: NATIONAL
AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION §§ 1031-33, at 1888-97 (1975) (contrasting the view
of the lesser developed nations versus the developed nations towards technical rights).
227. See International Trade Impact of Intellectual Property Issues Examined at
BNA Conference, Int'l Trade Rep., (BNA) No. 30, at 969 (July 29, 1987) (describing
foreign intellectual property protection as ranging from a total absence of laws, to bad
laws, to non-enforcement of the laws).
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malist nations argue for a bright-line test of international copyright, 28
not only because the minimalist nations feel threatened by the more
developed nations but also because they resent the giant technology
gap. 229 Striving to achieve a market for computer software through
limited copyright protection, the lesser developed countries suggest that
original works, or any part thereof, should be readily accessible without
fear of infringement.230
The maximalists nations, in contrast, reject the class-based argu-
ments favoring a bright-line standard of copyright, notably for the very
same reasons as the minimalists.2 31 Emphasizing how the current
means of international copyright protection focus on stimulating eco-
nomic growth and cultural development, 232 the developed maximalist
nations consider broad copyright protection the means by which the
developing nations may gain new routes of international trade and
therefore new routes of economic development.233 The maximalists
maintain: if copying of computer programs were legal in any venue, the
larger computer software firm could easily rob an individual author of
his or her work.234 A market for computer software would thus never
228. Id.
229. See A. GAUHAR, THE RICH AND THE POOR: DEVELOPMENT, NEGOTIATIONS
AND COOPERATION - AN ASSESSMENT 44-46 (1983) (considering the means to inspire
greater economic development among the lesser developed nations).
230. Lecture by J. Kaufman, Adjunct Professor at the Washington College of Law,
The American University, in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 28, 1991). The theory of the
lesser developed nations is as follows:
Because we are poor, we cannot purchase the software from the computer indus-
tries of the developed nations. If we are allowed to copy the software freely, to
study the programs, and to develop a viable computer software industry in our
own county, then we may eventually be able to purchase the products upon the
open market. But for the ability to copy the computer software, we will never be
able to participate in the international computer software marketplace.
Id. (Emphasis added.) The problem with this argument is obvious - the college stu-
dent could make the same argument, as could a new computer programmer in the
industry, as could an "underdeveloped" computer software manufacturer. Where would
the ability to copy the software in order to achieve technological sophistication end?
231. See A. CLAPES, SOFTWARE, COPYRIGHT, & COMPETITION 202-203 (1989)
(supporting broad copyright protection to encourage innovations and advancement).
232. See Note, Future Intellectual Property, supra note 6, at 317-23 (arguing that
broad international copyright laws would inspire, not inhibit, the computer software
industry both in developing nations as well as in the industrialized nations).
233. See id. at 317-18 (declaring that "[d]eveloping nations as well as the industri-
alized nations would benefit by the retention and expansion of the international copy-
right system" as well as "foster[ing] international cooperation in bringing about cul-
tural and economic exchanges").
234. See Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 77-78 (decrying the advantages of judicial inter-




arise in a developing nation where the individual author maintained no
means of copyright protection.2"5
The continuing debate between the copyright minimalists of the de-
veloping nations and the developed maximalist nations touches many
areas of public and economic policy.236 In sum, however, the danger of
lax or nonexistent copyright protection cuts both nationally and inter-
nationally against the creator of an original work of authorship.
37
Whether for the user interface of computer software, a work of fiction,
or law journal article, copyright serves an essential and necessary role
in protecting any author's work in any venue.
23 8
B. CREATIVITY VERSUS STANDARDIZATION
The most persuasive public policy arguments for expanding or deny-
ing copyrightability for computer software in general, or user interface
specifically, involves the issues surrounding the compatibility and
standardization of computer software.239
Following the introduction of VISICALC in 1978,241 the rotated "L"
screen design of the VISICALC program immediately became a "stan-
dard" for all spreadsheet application programs;2  yet, the screen dis-
play precluded copyrightability because the design represented one of a
very limited number of ways to express the electronic spreadsheet
idea.242 In contrast with program standardization, "compatibility" in-
volves an entirely separate concept within the computer software indus-
235. Id.
236. GEMIGNANI, supra note 217, at 115-16 (describing the effect of copyright laws
on developing economies).
237. Note, Future Intellectual Property, supra note 6, at 321-23.
238. See id. at 323 (determining the most beneficial route to international develop-
ment through copyright). The author of this Note concludes that:
The observance of international copyright law depends largely on general aware-
ness, good faith and mutual understanding among all concerned. Copyright
should not be viewed merely as a relationship between the creator and the user.
It has to be seen in the large context of international cooperation and of the
urgent need to fill the development gap between the North and South.
Id. (citing Hasan, Copyright and Development, 16 COPYRIGHT BULL (UNESCO) No.
, Quarterly Rev., 1982, at 10).
239. Compare Note, Future Intellectual Property. supra note 6, at 321-23 (argu-
ing that standardization precludes per se creativity), with GE.IGNANI, supra note 217,
at 117-18 (noticing that standardization may indeed invoke creativity); see also supra
notes 219-25 (setting out the reasoning and rationale of the standardization argument).
240. See supra notes 146-54 and accompanying text (describing the development
process of LOTUS 1-2-3 and the program's reliance on the VISICALC program).
241. See Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 66 (describing how the rotated "L" design pre-
cluded copyrightability under the "idea" component of the idea/expression distinction).
242. Id.
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try.243 Compatibility refers not to the user's ability to manipulate data
within a computer program, but instead describes the form of the data
which the user may manipulate."4 The copyright maximalists argue
that compatibility may exist independent of general or uniform com-
puter program standardization (for example, LOTUS 1-2-3 may utilize
data from VISICALC); 245 yet, the minimalists contend that compati-
bility requires standardization (for example, VP-PLANNER or THE
TWIN must function exactly in the same manner as LOTUS 1-2-3).246
In the debate between the copyright maximalists and minimalists
over computer program standardization versus compatibility, the
predominate issue regards the most efficient means by which to en-
courage creativity in the computer software marketplace.247 The copy-
right maximalists claim that copyright protection inspires creativity by
forcing computer programmers to approach existing markets in new
and better ways.2' Through a creative evolution in computer software,
each new program would affect significant improvements to the "stan-
dard" program on the market.249 The copyright minimalists reject the
maximalists' "evolution of creativity" concept. 50 Instead, the minimal-
ists argue that creativity results only from adapting and implementing
new ideas to existing computer programs.251
243. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF COMPUTER TERMS 58 (3d ed. 1988)
(defining the term "compatibility"). Webster defines compatibility as:
(1) A property of some computer that allows programs written for one computer
to run on another (compatible) computer, even though it is a different model. (2)
The ability of different devices, such as a computer and a printer, to work to-
gether. (3) The ability of one program to use data from another program, such
as a spreadsheet in a report.
Id.
244. Id. Data that can be used in more than one spreadsheet program is thus
"compatible" with all of those programs. Id.
245. See Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 77 (describing the standardization and compatibil-
ity arguments as presented by Paperback (the "minimalist" position) and the Lotus
court (the "maximalist" position)).
246. Id.
247. See id. (contrasting the argument that standardization and/or compatibility
inspires creativity in the computer software marketplace).
248. Id.
249. Id. The development of the electronic spreadsheet idea from VISICALC to
LOTUS 1-2-3 to Microsoft's EXCEL serves as the best example of program develop-
ment. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. Sir Isaac Newton emphasized the importance of utilizing other's ideas
when he declared, "If I have seen further it is by standing on ye shoulders of Giants."
Newton, supra note 1, at 31. In Lotus, moreover, the court recognized the importance
of the OTSOG principle (On The Shoulders Of Giants, or "OTSOG"). Lotus, 740 F.
Supp. at 77-79; see also R. MERTON, ON THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTS: A SHANDEAN
POSTSCRIPT 270 (1965) (modernizing Newton's famous statement into "on the shoul-
ders of giants" and shortening the concept to the symbolic "OTSOG" principle). The
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The copyright laws of the United States preclude any policy goals
which require or even encourage the standardization of computer
software or any other form of copyrightable subject matter.252 As a
result, the minimalist argument that "standardization requires compat-
ibility in order to foster creativity" falls short of the history and devel-
opment of both computers and computer software products in the
United States.2 53 For personal computers, for example, the APPLE II
inspired the IBM PC which inspired the MACINTOSH which inspired
the IBM PC/2 which inspired the NeXT computer.25" ' Likewise, in the
spreadsheet industry, VISICALC inspired LOTUS 1-2-3 which in-
spired EXCEL.255 While many of these products served as a "tempo-
rary standard," significantly more advanced products subsequently re-
place the standard with a new and generally better product. 20 Indeed,
had the minimalist concept of standardization prevailed during the
early development of personal computers, we might still consider AS-
TEROIDS the video game of choice.257
C. RECENT AND UPCOMING DECISIONS
On June 28, 1990, in Lotus Development Corp. v. Paperback
Software International, a Massachusetts federal district court estab-
Lotus court even paralleled the OTSOG concept to the first or original author and
inventor: "There is no new thing under the sun. Men may say of something, 'Ah, this is
new!'--but it existed long ago before our time." Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 77 (citing
Ecclesiastes 1: 9-10). In Lotus, the court recognized that Paperback had pursued the
typical minimalist position, contending that industry standardization sometimes re-
quires the copying of certain aspects of computer programs. See id. at 78-79 (describ-
ing Paperback's reliance, in part, on the OTSOG principle). Paperback had claimed
that LOTUS 1-2-3 represented a de facto industry standard for all electronic spread-
sheets and that Paperback, in developing VP-PLANNER, had no choice but to follow
the standard. Id. In response to these arguments, Lotus declared that Paperback sought
to "flip copyright on its head." Id. at 79. The court stated that the more innovative a
product, the more protection the copyright laws should afford. Id. In addition, Lotus
also recognized the limits of the OTSOG principle, concluding that the "shoulders of
giants" extends only to the ideas, and not to the expression of a work of authorship. Id.
at 78.
252. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 79.
253. See A COMPUTER PERSPEcTIvE: BACKGROUND TO THE COMPUTER AGE 149-
59 (2d ed. 1990) (describing the development of the computer in the United States);
H. WULFORST, BREAKTHROUGH TO THE COMPUTER AGE 161-77 (1982) (considering
the development of the computer industry in the United States); F. COOPER III, LAW
AND THE SOFTWARE MANUFACTURER 34-43 (1988) (reciting the evolution of copyright
protection for computer software in the United States).
254. J. YOUNG, STEVE JoBs: THE JOURNEY is THE REWARD 409-28 (1988).
255. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 77.
256. Id.
257. See Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 222, 224 (1981)
(describing a copyright infringement suit by the makers of "Asteroids" against another
video game, "Meteors"). Atari introduced "Asteroids" in October of 1978, and by
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lished the copyrightability of user interface in computer software. 0 8
The last chapter of this story, however, took place on October 17, 1990
when Lotus agreed to an out-of-court settlement both with Paperback
and Mosaic. 259 Under the terms of the settlement agreement, Paper-
back agreed to remove VP-PLANNER from the market as well as to
pay Lotus $500,000 in damages.60 Most significantly, Paperback
agreed not to appeal, and Mosaic likewise decided to abide by the
ruling.2
61
The judicial precedent for the copyrightability of user interface in
computer software, however, remains anything but final. 2  In Lotus
Development Corp. v. Boreland International, Inc. 2 3 and Lotus Devel-
opment Corp. v. Santa Cruz Operation, Inc.,216 Lotus sued yet two
other computer software companies for infringing upon the user inter-
face of the LOTUS 1-2-3 program.6 5 In June of 1991, Lotus prevailed
1981 the game had become the largest-selling video game in the United States. Id. at
224. Compared with the Nintendo and Sega games of the 1990's, however, Asteroids
represents a mere "Model-T" of video games. Consider the limited function of the
original game:
The player commands a spaceship, represented by a small symbol that appears in
the center of the screen. During the course of the game, symbols representing
various sized rocks drift across the screen, and, at certain intervals, symbols rep-
resenting enemy spaceships enter and move around the screen and attempt to
shoot the player's spaceship. Four control buttons allow the player to rotate his
ship clockwise or counterclockwise, to move the ship forward, and to fire a
weapon. A variety of appropriate sounds accompany the firing of weapons and
the destruction of the rocks and spaceships.
Id.
258. See supra notes 193-97 (setting forth the final opinion of the Lotus court over
the copyrightability of user interface within computer software).
259. Lotus and Paperback Software Reach Out-of-Court Settlement, BUSINESS
WIRE, Oct. 17, 1990, at 1.
260. Id. Mosaic also agreed to discontinue marketing of THE TWIN. Id.
261. Id.
262. See Antton, Copyright Protection and Innovation: The Impact of Lotus De-
velopment v. Paperback Software, THE COMPUTER LAWYER, August 1990, at 1
(describing the remaining questions of user interface copyright after the Lotus deci-
sion); Abramson, Why Lotus-Paperback Uses the Wrong Test and What the New
Software Protection Legislation Should Look Like, THE COMPUTER LAWYER, August
1990, at 6 (discussing questions that remain unanswered after Lotus); Petraske, An
Infringement Test for Comprehensive Similarity In Software Cases, THE COMPUTER
LAWYER, August 1990, at 12 (discussing unanswered questions following Lotus); Reed,
Airing Both Sides of the "Look-and-Feel" Debate, COMPUTERWORLD, Aug. 13, 1990,
at 21 (also addressing unanswered questions).
263. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l Inc., The Boston Globe, July 3, 1990, at 41
(D. Mass. July 2, 1990).
264. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Santa Cruz Operation, Inc., The Boston Globe, July 3,
1990, at 41 (D. Mass. July 2, 1990).
265. See Simon, Lotus Sues 2 More for Copyright Violations, The Boston Globe,
July 3, 1990, at 41 (describing Lotus's suits against tow other infringers upon the LO-
TUS 1-2-3 copyright). On July 2, 1990, Lotus sued Boreland Int'l Inc. (Borland) and
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in its suit against Santa Cruz Operation, Inc. (SCO) when SCO agreed
to cease production of SCO PROFESSIONAL, a UNIX-based clone
of LOTUS 1-2-3.266 The dispute between Lotus and Boreland Interna-
tional, Inc., however, continues. 6 7 In SAPC, Incorporated v. Lotus De-
velopment Corp.,26 8 on the other hand, The Lotus Corporation found
itself the defendant in a copyright suit for infringing upon the VISI-
CALC copyright in LOTUS 1-2-3.26 9 The claim failed because Lotus
owned the rights to the VISICALC program.270
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,271 however, perhaps repre-
sents the most important recent development among the cases consider-
ing the scope of copyrightability for computer software. The case in-
volves the ongoing litigation in the dispute between Apple Computer
Incorporated (Apple) and the Microsoft Corporation (Microsoft). 7 2
The genesis of the copyright dispute in Microsoft arose after Apple
developed and began marketing the MACINTOSH line of computers
in the early 19801s.173 Distinctive for a unique graphic user interface,
27 4
Santa Cruz Operations Inc. (SCO) for copyright violation. Id. Borland, maker of
QUATTRO, and SCO, maker of SCO PROFESSIONAL, market products similar to
the LOTUS 1-2-3 program. Id. The QUATTRO products are the third most popular
PC spreadsheets, and SCO PROFESSIONAL is the most popular spreadsheet for the
UNIX operating system. Id.
266. See Keefe, Lotus Bags Third Copyright Win, COMPtrrERwoRLu, June 24,
1991, at 16 (describing the out-of-court settlement whereby SCO agreed to stop the
manufacture, distribution, and license of SCO PROFESSIONAL and Lotus offered
SCO customers a $200 price break on 1-2-3 for UNIX System V); Pacarille, Lotus
Settles with SCO, but Continues Battle with Borland, INFOWORLu, June 24, 1991, at
152 (citing Lotus' out-of-court settlement with SCO); Siegmann, Lotus Wins Third
Copyright Battle, San Francisco Chronicle, June 18, 1991, at CI (also addressing the
SCO out-of-court settlement).
267. See Rosenberg, Lotus, Borland Trade Jabs In Copyright Case, The Boston
Globe, Oct. 2, 1991, at 62 (describing the infringement against Borland by Lotus).
Significantly, Judge Keeton, the same judge from the Lotus case, is presiding over the
Borland dispute. Id.
268. 921 F.2d 360 (1990).
269. Id. at 361.
270. Id. at 362-63. The copyright infringement suit against Lotus failed because
Lotus owned the rights to the VISICALC program pursuant to the purchase of
Software Arts, the original owner to the VISICALC copyright. Id. at 364.
271. No. 88-20149 (N.D. Cal. filed 1989).
272. Apple Computer v. Microsoft Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1444, 1447 (N.D. Cal.
1991) (order denying motion for summary judgment in part) [hereinafter Microsoft].
273. Id.
274. Id. "Apple made one of the major commercial breakthroughs of the 1980's.
The graphic user interface generated by the Macintosh system software consists of
windows, icons, pull-down menus, and other images or visual displays projected on the
computer screen." Id. Based on a graphic user interface design for the APPLE II se-
ries, the user interface of the MACINTOSH relies on graphic pictures (or "icons") for
all system operating procedures. Id. Programs may be accessed (or "run"), deleted,
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the MACINTOSH became an immediate success.17 5 Although the
computer contained many functional improvements (such as graphic
capability and speed), the MACINTOSH operating system software or
"user interface" comprised the fundamental link of the computer's suc-
cess.27 6 Microsoft subsequently developed a similar operating system
for IBM and IBM-compatible computers called WINDOWS.177 In re-
sponse to Apple's objections, 78 Microsoft entered into a software li-
censing agreement with Apple on November 22, 1985 (1985 Agree-
ment) whereby Apple granted Microsoft a "non-exclusive, royalty-free,
non-transferrable license" to use the MACINTOSH user interface
within certain Microsoft products. 79 When Microsoft granted the
Hewlett-Packard Company (Hewlett-Packard) a license to use the
WINDOWS program in the NEWWAVE application program,280 Apple
balked over the license arrangement and filed suit for copyright in-
fringement of the MACINTOSH operating system by Microsoft2 81 and
Hewlett-Packard.
282
At summary judgment proceedings, 283 two California federal district
court judges considered the similarities between the MACINTOSH
renamed, or moved from one location to another on the machine's main menu screen
(or "desktop"). Id.
275. Id. The court recognized the significance of the MACINTOSH operating sys-
tem software:
The Macintosh user interface [footnote omitted] proved so intuitive that users
were able fairly quickly to learn how to manipulate the screen displays and
mouse and thus accomplish what had theretofore been the daunting task of
learning to operate a computer. This breakthrough vaulted Apple to the top of
the personal computer industry.
Id.
276. Id.
277. Id. In 1985, Microsoft created WINDOWS VERSION 1.0 (WINDOWS
1.0), a MACINTOSH-style graphic user interface for IBM and IBM-compatible com-
puters. Id.
278. Id. Apple considered WINDOWS 1.0 a facial violation of the copyright for
the MACINTOSH operating system. Id.
279. Id. In return, Microsoft agreed to improve existing software products for the
MACINTOSH and to develop new products to make the MACINTOSH a more at-
tractive alternative to the IBM PC. Id.
280. Id. Hewlett-Packard sought to use WINDOWS 1.0 in a new application pro-
gram called NEWWAVE. Id.
281. Id. In addition to the arrangement between Microsoft and Hewlett-Packard,
Apple contested the release of WINDOWS VERSION 2.03 (WINDOWS 2.03), a
program almost identical to MACINTOSH's user interface. Id. Microsoft claimed that
WINDOWS 2.03 fell under the license provisions of the 1985 Agreement as an en-
hancement of the earlier WINDOWS VERSIONS 1.0 program. Id. Apple rejected
Microsoft's claim and pursued the infringement action. Id.
282. Id. at 1447-48.
283. See Apple Computer v. Microsoft Corp., 709 F. Supp. 925, 927 (N.D. Cal.
1989) (order granting motion for summary judgment in part and denying motion for
summary judgment in part) (deeming a license agreement insufficient as a complete
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"visual displays" and those of the WINDOWS and NEWWAVE pro-
grams."8 4 As of the August 14, 1991 interim proceeding, however, the
district court had not yet rendered an opinion as to the validity and/or
scope of Apple's copyrights in the visual displays of the MACINTOSH
operating system.28 5 In earlier proceedings, Judge Schwarzer had sug-
gested that the operating system precluded copyrightability, 20  yet
Judge Walker expressed disfavor with Schwarzer's analysis in a subse-
quent consideration of the case.287 Judge Walker nevertheless hesitated
from embracing a ruling similar to Lotus on the scope of copyright-
ability for the user interface in computer software. 58
Microsoft comes close, however, to establishing the copyrightability
of the "visual displays" in the MACINTOSH operating system. 29
When, for example, Microsoft and Hewlett-Packard claimed that the
MACINTOSH visual displays constituted derivative works of earlier
programs by the Xerox Corporation,9 0 the Microsoft court rejected
any fraud upon the Copyright Office by Apple.2 1 The court further
deemed the MACINTOSH operating system an "original work" and
defense to an infringement action based upon subsequent revisions of the subject-mat-
ter of the license); Apple Computer v. Microsoft Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1428, 1431 (N.D.
Cal. 1989) (order granting motion for summary judgment in part) (recognizing that
the license agreement fails to specify user interface as synonymous with visual
displays).
284. Microsoft, 759 F. Supp. at 1448-49. At the earlier summary judgment pro-
ceedings, Judge Schwarzer had considered the similarities and differences in the MAC-
INTOSH, WINDOWS, and NEWWAVE operating systems by referencing the "visual
displays." Id. Judge Schwarzer applied this approach because the 1985 Agreement
used the specific term, "visual display." Id. at 1448 n.4.
285. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1236 (N.D. Cal.
1991) (order granting motion for summary judgment in part and denying motion for
summary judgment in part).
286. Microsoft, 759 F. Supp. at 1449. In the Microsoft opinion, the court notes
that: "Implicit in Judge Schwarzer's approach to the case is a rejection of Apple's
fundamental contention that the 'total concept and feel' of the Macintosh graphic user
interface is protectible expression." Id. The court further recognized that "Judge
Schwarzer's approach appears to have been to exclude licensed visual displays prior to
applying the substantial similarity of idea and expression tests." Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 1454-55.
290. Id. Apple conceded that Xerox's SMALLTALK and STAR programs
strongly influenced the development and design of the MACINTOSH operating system
software. Id. at 1454.
291. Id. The Microsoft court recognized that: "All works are derived to a certain
degree from pre-existing works. A derivative work within the meaning of the copyright
law, however, is one which substantially borrows the expression of ideas from an ex-
isting work." Id. Finding no evidence of substantial infringement, the court denied the
defense, concluding: "although there is evidence that Apple's designers borrowed ideas
from Xerox's Smalltalk and Star programs, there is no substantiation for the allega-
tion." Id.
19921
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thus copyrightable.2 92 Nevertheless, Microsoft stopped short of estab-
lishing the copyrightability of the visual displays, instead rendering the
issue the proper basis of subsequent adjudication. 9 3 Significantly, the
decision of this "subsequent adjudication" may possibly determine the
life span of Lotus Development Corp. v. Paperback Software Interna-
tional in the federal copyright jurisprudence of the United States.2 94
CONCLUSION
In writing "[i]f I have seen further it is by standing on ye shoulders
of Giants," Sir Isaac Newton expressed his understanding that the fu-
ture improvement of any work remains possible only by furthering
upon the work of others.295 In the case of a work of authorship, an
indefinite distinction exists between "improving" upon another's work
and the "copying" of that work. Inherent in this distinction is the con-
stitutional right of copyright. This right, moreover, also embodies an-
other, albeit less theoretical, conflict between the betterment of the
public welfare through free access to copyrightable works and the au-
292. Id. at 1455. The Microsoft court reiterated the basis of the originality require-
ment for a copyrightable work: "The standard of originality required for copyright-
ability is minimal. [citation omitted]. To fulfill the originality requirement, a work
need only be independently created by the author and embody a very modest amount of
intellectual labor; novelty or uniqueness is not essential." Id. As a result, the court
determined that the MACINTOSH operating system met this standard. Id.
293. Id. The Microsoft court suggested:
Accordingly, HP's affirmative defense regarding fraud on the Copyright Office
and both HP and Microsoft's affirmative defenses of lack of originality are dis-
missed from the case. HP and Microsoft's defenses to infringement, scope of
protection, merger, and scenes a faire doctrines remain in issue and would be
appropriately discussed in connection with an adjudication regarding substantial
similarity.
Id. at 1455-56.
294. Although Judge Walker seems to favor adjudicating the issue of copyright-
ability for "visual displays," the question remains whether the district court will con-
sider the copyright question in subsequent proceedings. In the final analysis on the
copyright issue, the Microsoft court concluded:
Although the court did invite motions addressing the issue of "scope of protec-
tion" of Apple's copyrights and the merger doctrine has been applied in other
circuits to preclude copyrightability of a particular work, the court must follow
the law of the Ninth Circuit. Since the court did not invite motions regarding the
issue of substantial similarity, a resolution whether the works in suit are not
substantially similar because of the merger of the idea and expression in Apple's
visual displays is premature at this time.
Id.
As of the deadline for the submission of this Note, the federal district court for the
northern district of California had not rendered the final decision in the Apple Com-
puter v. Microsoft Corp. case.
295. Newton, supra note 1, at 31.
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thor's right to a limited monopoly over the reproduction, distribution,
adaptation, performance, and display of those original works.
In balancing these dual conflicts under the copyright laws - an au-
thor's right to a limited monopoly vis-a-vis the benefit to the general
public and the more amorphous distinction between improving upon an
author's work and the copying of that work-the United States federal
courts have formulated a myriad of tests to ascertain the boundaries of
each interest. The copyrightability of user interface in computer
software perhaps easily illuminates these conflicts because of the obvi-
ous distinction between the noncopyrightable idea (such as an elec-
tronic spreadsheet) and the copyrightable expression (such as the com-
mand-tree of any individual computer program). Recognizing this
distinction, the court in Lotus Development Corp. v. Paperback
Software International adopted a test which looks to the telltale con-
cepts of idea and expression to differentiate the scope of copyright pro-
tection for computer software. By application of the United States Su-
preme Court case of Baker v. Seldan, Lotus concluded that, while the
idea of an electronic spreadsheet program precludes copyrightability, a
specific means of expressing the idea within a computer program (such
as VISICALC, LOTUS 1-2-3, or EXCEL) achieves a sufficiently
unique and thus copyrightable status. By defining the dichotomy be-
tween the noncopyrightable idea versus copyrightable expression within
the elements of a computer program, Lotus efficiently balanced the two
constitutional policy interests of copyright, as well as silenced the con-
flicting ideals of fair use, by establishing the copyrightability of user
interface within computer software.296
296. In applying the elements of the Baker v. Seldan idea/expression dichotomy as
modified by Lotus in the "modified Baker test," Lotus established the copyrightability
of the nonliteral elements of a computer program if a court can answer two questions
in the affirmative. First, a court must consider whether the aspect in question consti-
tutes a distinctive detail of the computer program. Second, the court must determine
whether the aspect involves the only means to express the idea. If the answer to both
questions are in the affirmative, the nonliteral element of the computer program is
copyrightable. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 67-68; see also supra note 191 (setting out a
schematic of the Lotus test of copyrightability for the user interface of computer
software).
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